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Arbitrators in international arbitrations must observe ethical obligations of impartiality and independence, 
competence, diligence, confidentiality and compliance with the arbitration agreement. A New Zealand 
understanding of these standard international obligations is influenced by New Zealand’s ethical culture. New 
Zealand arbitrators practicing overseas must recognise how their culture affects their approach to ethical 
obligations. In particular, they must be aware that a New Zealand approach to impartiality and independence may 
be seen as relaxed by those outside New Zealand. A New Zealand approach to ethical obligations is also applied 
during the enforcement of arbitrators’ obligations where New Zealand is the seat of an international arbitration. 
Foreign parties are likely to be satisfied with the enforcement of ethical obligations in New Zealand. This is good 
news for those seeking to establish New Zealand as a regional hub of international arbitration.  
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The growth that international arbitration has experienced in recent decades has been 
accompanied by the development of ethical obligations governing the behaviour of arbitrators 
within international arbitrations. It is generally accepted that arbitrators acting in international 
arbitrations must be impartial and independent, competent, diligent, confidential and they must 
comply with the arbitration agreement. While these ethical obligations exist internationally, an 
individual’s understanding of each obligation is influenced by their ethical background.  
 
It is important to appreciate the effect of a country’s ethical culture on understandings of these 
ostensibly standard obligations. Understanding this effect is the first necessary step towards 
ensuring that those involved in international arbitrations share the same expectations. Someone 
who is aware of their ethical culture and how it affects their understanding of ethical obligations 
will recognise that parties in an international arbitration may have different expectations of 
arbitrator behaviour. This allows individuals to adjust their approach to these obligations in 
accordance with the parties’ legitimate expectations. This facilitates effective dispute 
resolution through international arbitration.  
This paper considers New Zealand’s culture of ethics and how it influences understandings of 
ethical obligations. It is concerned solely with an arbitrator’s ethical obligations within 
international arbitration.  This is because a New Zealand understanding of ethical obligations 
is most likely to clash with divergent attitudes at the international level. This paper may be seen 
as a tool for arbitrators to whom ethical obligations apply, and for those enforcing these 
obligations in New Zealand. 
New Zealand’s ethical culture can affect the way New Zealand arbitrators approach their 
ethical obligations. This may be a problem for arbitrators working in international arbitration 
overseas, particularly where fundamental obligations of impartiality and independence are 
concerned. New Zealand arbitrators must recognise how their background influences their 
approach to ethical obligations. This will allow them to adjust their approach to ethical 
obligations for the particular context.  
The ethical culture of New Zealand also guides the enforcement of ethical obligations where 
New Zealand is the seat of an international arbitration. Again, an awareness of New Zealand’s 
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ethical culture and its effects is important for those enforcing arbitrators’ ethical obligations. 
This is particularly important in relation to impartiality and independence as the New Zealand 
approach to these obligations may appear relaxed to outside parties.  
Despite New Zealand’s relatively relaxed approach to impartiality and independence, foreign 
parties should be satisfied with New Zealand’s standard of ethical regulation. Arbitral 
institutions and professional groups are the primary regulators of arbitrators and have an 
interest in ensuring high standards of behaviour. They will take ethical obligations, including 
impartiality and independence, very seriously within the New Zealand context. The New 
Zealand courts act as a backstop enforcer of ethical obligations and will only interfere with 
proceedings in serious cases of arbitrator misconduct where alternative means of regulation are 
unavailable. This is an appropriate role for the courts. That foreign parties should be satisfied 
by the New Zealand’s enforcement of ethical obligations is good news for New Zealand’s 
arbitration industry which seeks to establish New Zealand as destination for international 
arbitration in the Asia-Pacific region.  
The necessary background to this analysis is provided in Part II of this paper.  Part III 
investigates the culture of ethics within New Zealand. Part IV discusses each of an arbitrator’s 
ethical obligations in turn. This discussion indicates where the obligations of impartiality and 
independence, competence, diligence, confidentiality and compliance are found in the New 
Zealand context.  It also considers how each obligation is understood in New Zealand. Part V 
considers the consequences that a New Zealand understanding of ethical obligations has for 
New Zealanders working as arbitrators in international arbitrations. Part VI contemplates the 
effect of a New Zealand understanding on the enforcement of these ethical obligations and 
what this means for New Zealand’s future as a seat of international arbitration.  
II Background   
To understand the ethical obligations of an arbitrator in an international arbitration it is crucial 
to understand the background against which these obligations exist. Firstly, a basic 
understanding of the role of the arbitrator within arbitration is necessary. Subpart A provides 
this information insofar as it is relevant to the remainder of this paper. Subpart B will then 
address why it is necessary to consider the ethical obligations of arbitrators within international 
arbitration.  
 
 Arbitrator Ethics in New Zealand: the New Zealand Approach to Ethical Obligations in International Arbitration  
6 
 
A The Role of the Arbitrator in Arbitration   
Arbitrators are chosen to adjudicate conflicts between parties.  While this is the ultimate 
objective of an arbitrator, the precise role of an arbitrator in any proceeding depends on the 
nature of the arbitration.  For example, an arbitrator’s role in a specific arbitration is “subject 
to change through individually crafted arbitration agreements.”1  Moreover, the exact nature of 
the arbitrator’s role may vary according to whether the proceeding is ad hoc or administered 
through an institution, as well as the number of arbitrators involved in the proceeding.  
Ad hoc arbitrations are “administered by the arbitral tribunal”,2 and do not “rely on the 
supervision or formal administration of an arbitration center.”3  On the other hand, institutional 
arbitrations are administered through pre-established arbitral institutions.4 The behaviour of 
arbitrators in institutional arbitration is governed by “pre-established rules of organisation and 
procedure”.5 The opportunity to enforce an arbitrator’s ethical obligations depends to a large 
extent on whether a proceeding is ad hoc or institutional. This issue is considered further in 
discussion on ‘Enforcing Ethical Obligations in New Zealand’ in Part VI.6  
The number of arbitrators charged with adjudicating a conflict varies between arbitrations.  In 
some cases a sole arbitrator will preside over the proceeding. In others, a panel of arbitrators 
(often three individuals) will be engaged to resolve the dispute.7 Where a proceeding involves 
a panel of arbitrators, the panel will often be composed of two individuals unilaterally 
appointed by each party and a third ‘chairperson’ that the parties or the party-appointed 
arbitrators have agreed on.8  Whether an arbitrator is jointly or unilaterally appointed may affect 
their relationship with the parties. Whether this affects the nature of their ethical obligation is 
a matter of controversy that is considered below.9   
                                                             
1 Catherine A. Rogers “Regulating International Arbitration: A Functional Approach to Developing Standards”      
(2005) 41 Stan. J. Int’l L 53 at 106.  
2 Mauro Rubino-Sammartano International Arbitration: Law and Practise (2nd ed, Kluwer Law Journal, The 
Hague, 2001) at 4.  
3 Walter Mattli “Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration” (2001) 55 Int’l Org 919 at 
927. 
4 Rubino-Sammartano, above n 2, at 4. 
5 Aleksander Goldstajn “Choice of International Arbitrators, Arbitral Tribunals and Centres: Legal and 
Sociological Aspects” in Petar Sarcevic (ed) Essays on International Commercial Arbitration (Graham & 
Trotham Ltd., London, 1989) 27 at 33.  
6 See discussion at 38.  
7 Rubino-Sammartano, above n 2, at 312.  
8 See discussion in Rogers, above n 1; see also Rubino-Sammartano, above n 2, at 318 - 319. 
9 See discussion on party-appointed arbitrators below, at 24.   
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B Why Should We Care About Ethical Obligations in International Arbitration? 
The need to regulate arbitrators has been widely accepted. An arbitrator is required to act as 
‘judge’ in coming to a binding (and often final) decision on a dispute. This is a significant 
responsibility. It is understandable that parties expect the person or persons charged with 
resolving their conflict to adhere to certain standards of behaviour.  As Paulsson indicates, the 
legitimacy of the arbitral process relies on the confidence reposed in the ethical standards of 
arbitrators.10  
Arbitration has experienced a rapid growth in popularity over the last few decades. The 
expansion of arbitration has meant that the ‘informal social controls’ that previously regulated 
professional conduct within international arbitration are no longer sufficient.11  The growth of 
international arbitration has led to increased cultural and legal diversity in international 
arbitration today.12 The changing nature of international arbitration has led the informal social 
controls of the past to be replaced by ethical rules.  
Regulation of arbitrator conduct at the international level has been the topic of considerable 
scholarship. In 2005 Rogers said “professional standards and procedures for regulating 
arbitrators represent only partial and imperfect modifications on the earlier regime based on 
self-regulation.”13 In the decade since the statement was made there has been ongoing 
development in the regulation of arbitrators. While certain matters concerning the ethical 
obligations of arbitrators remain controversial,14 the “primary sources and mechanisms for 
professional regulation for arbitration” have been developed.15 These include the International 
Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration,16 as well 
as the rules of various arbitral institutions.17 These developments have stemmed largely from 
private international actors and do not recognise the fact that a person’s understanding of an 
ostensibly standard ethical obligation is influenced by their national culture.  
                                                             
10 Jan Paulsson The Idea of Arbitration (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 147.   
11 Rogers, above n 1, at 61.  
12 Rogers, above n 1, at 62. 
13 Rogers, above n 1, at 57. 
14 See discussion on ‘continuing uncertainty’ at 23.  
15 Catherine A. Rogers Ethics in International Arbitration (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) at 7.  
16 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (International Bar Association, London, 
2004) [IBA Guidelines 2004]. These Guidelines have since been updated in 2014: IBA Guidelines on Conflicts 
of Interest in International Arbitration (International Bar Association, London, 2014) [IBA Guidelines 2014].  
17 Rogers, above n 15, at 7. 
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Perceptions of ‘ethical’ or ‘unethical’ behaviour are influenced by an individual’s cultural 
context. While ethical obligations for arbitrators have developed at an international level the 
standard obligations that exist may apply differently across cultures. The possibility of ethical 
obligations having various interpretations poses a challenge to those engaged in international 
arbitration.  While the development of ethical obligations at an international level is significant, 
it is also important that these obligations are uniformly understood. This means it is necessary 
to consider how the existing ethical obligations that govern arbitrator behaviour with 
international arbitration are understood in the New Zealand context.   
While New Zealand is not currently a seat of choice for international arbitration, New 
Zealanders may work as arbitrators in foreign jurisdictions. It is important that New Zealanders 
engaged overseas understand the subconscious effect of New Zealand’s ethical culture on the 
way they understand their obligations as arbitrators.  
The Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand Inc (AMINZ) has expressed its 
intention to establish New Zealand as a regional hub for international arbitration.18  AMINZ is 
the primary professional group representing arbitrators in New Zealand and a central 
organisation within New Zealand’s arbitration landscape. The expressed intentions of AMINZ 
means it is necessary to examine how the ethical obligations of arbitrators are enforced in New 
Zealand and what effect this may have on New Zealand’s popularity as a regional seat of choice 
for international arbitration.  
III  New Zealand’s Culture of Ethics 
This paper offers a unique New Zealand perspective on the ethical obligations of arbitrators.  
Culture affects the way people perceive ‘ethical situations’.19 Therefore, a general 
understanding of New Zealand’s culture of ethics is essential to fully understand the scope of 
arbitrators’ ethical obligations in the New Zealand context. There is little commentary available 
on New Zealand’s ethical culture. Therefore, this investigation attempts to distil an 
understanding of New Zealand’s ethical culture by looking at New Zealand culture and the 
nature of New Zealand’s legal profession.  
                                                             
18 For example the New Zealand International Arbitration Centre was established in 2013; see also the 
discussion in John G Walton “International Arbitration: Are we seat or are we just sitting” (paper presented to 
AMINZ Conference, Queenstown, August 2014).  
19 See Scott J Vitell, Saviour L. Nwachukwa and James H. Barnes “The Effects of Culture on Ethical Decision-
Making: An Application of Hofstede’s Typology” (1993) 12 Journal of Business Ethics 753 at 753. 
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Subpart A considers general aspects of New Zealand’s culture. Discussion in subpart A is 
limited to aspects of New Zealand’s culture that may be expected to influence New Zealand’s 
culture of ethics and, in turn, the approach  taken to the ethical obligations of arbitrators. 
Therefore while certain features of New Zealand society, such as multiculturalism and tikanga 
Māori, are important features of New Zealand culture, they are not included in this discussion.  
Subpart B focuses on the particular nature of New Zealand’s legal profession and how this may 
affect ethics within the legal community.  Although arbitrators are not required to be legally 
qualified, they are often sourced from this legal community. Subpart C draws this discussion 
together by making tentative conclusions on New Zealand’s culture of ethics.  
A New Zealand Culture 
Analysing one’s own culture can be problematic. The nature of culture often means that a 
person is so familiar with their own culture that they fail to fully understand its unique 
characteristics. To get around this issue this paper considers the clichés and oft-repeated 
descriptions used in relation to New Zealand culture. The related values of egalitarianism and 
conformity are considered first.  New Zealand’s so-called pragmatism and ‘can-do’ attitude are 
discussed second. Some of the social phenomena described below are time-worn and do not 
necessarily represent contemporary New Zealand society. Nonetheless, the context behind 
these social phenomena and their continued resonance with New Zealand society warrants their 
consideration.  
1 Egalitarianism and conformity 
New Zealand has historically been described as an ‘egalitarian’ society.20  While perceptions 
of equality continue, ‘equal’ is no longer an accurate description of New Zealand society.  A 
recent report published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) demonstrates that New Zealand society has been seriously affected by growing 
                                                             
20 Jock Philips “Class – Understanding Class” (12 July 2012) Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand 
<www.TeAra.govt.nz>; see also Jeffrey C Kennedy “Leadership and Culture in New Zealand” in Jagdeep S 
Chhokar, Felix C Brodbeck and Robert J House (eds) Culture and Leadership Across the World: The GLOBE 
book of In-Depth Studies of 25 Societies (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, 2007) 397 at 399; and  
Duncan Webb “Judicial Conduct in Very Small Places: Some Contextual Questions” (2003) 6 Legal Ethics 106 
at 109; and Stephen Levine “‘Political Values – The fair society” (13 July 2012) Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of 
New Zealand <www.TeAra.govt.nz> which explains the opinion of Leslie Lipson, New Zealand’s first political 
science professor that in contrast to the United States of America and their Statute of Liberty, New Zealand’s 
political views would be best symbolised in a ‘Statute of Equality’.   
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inequality in the last 20 years.21 Nevertheless, while New Zealand is no longer an equal society 
in reality, egalitarian values continue to influence the ethical culture of New Zealand.  
The notion of ‘egalitarianism’ continues to resonate in New Zealand. As Webb notes, “There 
is a perception of equality in New Zealand that is arguably quite unique.”22 He later observes 
that “while academically such a view is now considered almost absurd, and inaccurate even 
when uttered, there remains in the public perception a strong notion of egalitarianism.”23 While 
egalitarianism may be a myth, a persistent public belief in this myth may nonetheless shape the 
culture of New Zealand.  
The egalitarian myth is manifested in a general aversion to a person’s wealth or status affecting 
the way they are treated.24 This social behaviour is explained in the Auckland University 
webpage that provides information about “social norms” to help international students adjust 
to life in New Zealand.25 The webpage states that “New Zealand people dislike formality and 
tend to see each other as equals.” While it may be naïve to claim that all New Zealanders see 
each other as equal, the fact that this advice is given to international students indicates that this 
is considered to be a characteristic of New Zealanders on the whole.  
Perceptions of egalitarianism also manifest in national values of conformity or the so-called 
‘tall poppy’ syndrome. A tall poppy refers to a “conspicuously successful person.”26 Tall poppy 
syndrome refers to a societal tendency to “to cut (an apparently successful person) down to 
size.”27 To achieve highly is to distinguish oneself from one’s peers. Insofar as tall poppy 
syndrome exists in New Zealand it demonstrates an aversion to social distinction.28   
However, like egalitarianism, the extent to which the tall poppy syndrome remains applicable 
to New Zealand society has been challenged in recent years. The online Encyclopedia of New 
                                                             
21 Max Rashbrooke “How New Zealand’s Rich-Poor Divide Killed its Egalitarian Paradise” The Guardian 
(online ed, London, 12 December 2014).  
22 Webb, above n 20, at 108. 
23 Webb, above n 20, at 109. 
24 Webb, above n 20, at 109. 
25 The University of Auckland “New Zealand social values” <www.auckland.ac.nz>. 
26 V Suchitra Mouly and Jayaram K. Sankaran The Tall Poppy Syndrome in New Zealand: An Exploratory 
Investigation (The University of Auckland Department of Management Science and Information Systems, 
Working Paper No. 222, March 2001) at 1; referring to the definition of ‘tall poppy’ contained in the Oxford 
Dictionary of New Zealand English 1997 edition.  
27 Mouly and Sankaran, above n 26, at 1; see also Kennedy, above n 20, at 399.   
28 See also discussion in V Suchitra Mouly and Jayaram K. Sankaran “The Enactment of Envy within 
Organisations” (2002) 38.1 The Journal of Applied Behavioural Science 36 at 54, in which the connection 
between egalitarianism and tall poppy syndrome is clearly made.  
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Zealand connects tall poppy syndrome to New Zealand society in the 1950s.29 The website 
suggests that “by the 2000s there was less cutting down of ‘tall poppies’, less pressure to 
conform and a much greater readiness to celebrate excellence and diversity.”30 While this may 
be true, a nuanced application of tall poppy syndrome persists in New Zealand society. 
New Zealanders are proud of fellow citizens who achieve highly in their field (especially on 
the international stage).31 Examples include Sir Edmund Hillary, All Black’s captain Richie 
McCaw and the singer Lorde.32 While these successful individuals have not been ‘cut down’ 
there is a general interest that these ‘tall poppies’ remain grounded or down-to-earth.33 This 
interest is reflected in the fact that “many [New Zealand] celebrities…are able to go about their 
daily lives relatively untroubled by fans because they are not regarded as special and it would 
be seen as trammelling [the egalitarian] virtue to shower them in public adulation.”34  
New Zealand is not an equal society yet it clings to perceptions of egalitarianism.  This is seen 
in the way New Zealanders generally avoid treating people differently on the basis of wealth 
and status. This is demonstrated when looking at the tall poppy syndrome in New Zealand.  
While New Zealand society may be more willing to celebrate achievement than it was in the 
past, humility remains highly valued.  
The persistence of egalitarian values has important implications for the nature of ethics in New 
Zealand. When a society insists on viewing everyone was ‘equals’, this must mean that 
everyone’s behaviour is judged according to the same standard. The value placed on humility 
                                                             
29 Stephen Levine “Political values - Political values and the ‘Kiwi’ way of life” (13 July 2012) Te Ara - the 
Encyclopedia of New Zealand <www.TeAra.govt.nz>.  
30 Levine, above n 29.  
31 See Kennedy, above n 20, at 422.  
32 The example of Sir Edmund Hillary who climbed Mt Everest in 1953 indicates that in fact the tall poppy 
syndrome has always been more about cutting down people who acted as if they were better than others rather 
than cutting down those who achieved highly.   
33 Regarding Richie McCaw see Sport New Zealand “McCaw leadership recognised through award” (press 
release, 21 May 2014) which quotes Sport New Zealand Chief Executive describing McCaw as having “earned 
the support and respect of the nation through his humble and down-to-earth nature.” Regarding Lorde see 
“Lorde’s hot New Zealand summer holiday” Stuff (online ed., New Zealand, 7 January 2015) which refers to 
the singer having a “typical Kiwi summer holiday” and mentions her humility. Regarding Sir Edmund Hillary 
see Justin Brown Myth New Zealand (Hurricane Press, Cambridge, 2010) at 148 and 149, where Brown 
comments on humility of the national hero who still had his name in the phone book and who sounded surprised 
when called at his home to be wished happy birthday by a New Zealand radio show. See also Kennedy, above n 
20, at 407, where Kennedy discusses the tall poppy syndrome and says that it is the “attitude displayed by the 
high achiever” that is important.  
34 Webb, above n 20, at 109.  
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is also part of New Zealand’s ethical culture and can influence reactions to misconduct. This 
will be further demonstrated by the legal community’s reaction to Hesketh J’s actions.35  
2 Pragmatism and a ‘can-do’ attitude  
‘Pragmatism’ is defined as “a reasonable and logical way of doing things or of thinking about 
problems that is based on dealing with specific situations instead of on ideas and theories.”36  
To describe New Zealanders as pragmatic means New Zealand citizens have a “practical, 
problem-solving approach to life.”37 This characteristic reportedly originates from New 
Zealand’s early colonial history.38 Pragmatism in New Zealand society has frequently been 
referred to as a ‘can-do’ attitude.  
Modern life in New Zealand does not demand the same pragmatic attitude that early pioneers 
needed to survive. However, despite changing circumstances, the value of pragmatism 
persists.39 This is exemplified in the “preference for common-sense solutions [that] can still be 
heard in New Zealander’s discussions of politics”.40   
It has been said that “New Zealanders don’t look favourably on rules, detailed administrative 
procedures, or being controlled by micromanaging bureaucrats.”41 This distaste for strict rules 
is arguably an extension of pragmatic values. A ‘can-do’ attitude is the antithesis of strict 
insistence on formal rules and procedures.  Where rules and procedures are seen as unnecessary 
and burdensome there is a risk that they will be overlooked.  
While New Zealand society generally values pragmatism, one must consider whether this 
extends to the legal profession. Lawyers must understand rules and procedure and must work 
with them on behalf of others. This suggests that the legal community has a greater respect for 
rules and procedure than New Zealand society generally. However, this does not prevent the 
legal profession being practical and problem-solving. Commentators have observed that a ‘can-
do’ attitude within New Zealand’s legal profession affects judicial ethics in New Zealand.42   
                                                             
35 See discussion concerning Hesketh J at 18.  
36 Merriam-Webster Dictionary “Pragmatism” <www.merriam-webster.com>.  
37 Kennedy, above n 20, at 400.  
38 Levine, above n 29.  
39 Levine, above n 29.  
40 Levine, above n 29.  
41 Kennedy, above n 20, at 422.  
42 Webb, above n 20, at 113. 
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A ‘can-do’ ethical attitude prevents “trifles” from interfering with an arbitrator’s job.43 This 
does not bode well for the necessary introspection required of arbitrators when considering 
their ethical obligations. This attitude may leave less prominent ethical issues overlooked or 
dismissed.  
B New Zealand’s Legal Profession 
This subpart considers the ethical culture pervading New Zealand’s legal profession.  The small 
and intimate nature of the legal community is considered first. This analysis is followed by two 
examples that demonstrate the legal profession’s approach to ethics. The ethical culture of New 
Zealand’s legal profession is part of the New Zealand context that may influence 
understandings of an arbitrator’s ethical obligations. This New Zealand context may affect the 
way New Zealand arbitrators engaged international arbitration view their ethical obligations, 
as well as the way these obligations are enforced within New Zealand.  
1 New Zealand has a small and intimate legal community 
New Zealand’s small population of approximately 4.5 million is reflected in the size of its legal 
community.44 At the time of writing, there are 12,422 people holding a New Zealand practising 
certificate.45 Of these lawyers, 545 are found outside New Zealand. The 11,877 lawyers found 
in New Zealand represents New Zealand’s legal community from which a culture of 
professional ethics emerges.   
Although 11,877 lawyers is not a significant number of lawyers in itself, it is considerable 
given the size of New Zealand’s overall population. New Zealand has one lawyer per 370 
individuals.46 This is similar to the proportion of lawyers in England.47 However, while New 
Zealand may have a relatively high proportion of lawyers, the small size of New Zealand’s 
                                                             
43 Webb, above n 20, at 113. 
44 The estimated resident population at the time of the latest census (July 2013) was 4,442,100. It has been 
estimated to have increased since then with the estimated population at 30 June 2014 at 4,509,900: see Statistics 
New Zealand “National Population Estimates: At 30 June 2014” (14 August 2014) <www.stats.govt.nz>. 
45 Email from Christine Schofield (Acting Registry Manager at the New Zealand Law Society) to Ella McLean 
(author) regarding the Law Society Registry (6 January 2015).  
46 Elliot Sim “Oversupply of lawyers an ‘opportunity’” LawTalk (New Zealand, 7 November 2014).  
47 Sim, above n 46.  
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legal profession makes it more likely for lawyers to be acquainted with one another than may 
be the case in larger jurisdictions.48 
Of the 11,877 lawyers currently in New Zealand, approximately 46% are based in Auckland.49 
Wellington is the second most popular region for lawyers with approximately 22% of lawyers 
in New Zealand found in the capital.50 Wellington also has the highest proportion of lawyers 
in the country.51 The concentration of lawyers in Auckland and Wellington increases the 
chance of lawyers knowing one another.  New Zealand has been described as a "tight-knit legal 
community” on this basis.52   
New Zealand’s judiciary is sourced from within this tight-knit legal community. Positions in 
the District Court and High Court are advertised and candidates are selected in consultation 
with both the legal profession and the judiciary.53 Judges sitting on the Court of Appeal and 
the Supreme Court are generally sourced from within the judiciary and positions are not 
publicly advertised.54 High Court judges feed into the Court of Appeal and “it is expected that 
most appointments to the Supreme Court will come from the Court of Appeal or the High 
Court.”55   
The process of judicial appointment in New Zealand is significant as it means the judiciary is 
closely intermingled with New Zealand’s tight-knit legal community. Although this reflects 
appointment procedures in other common law countries this approach is not universal. In Civil 
Law countries the career paths of judges and lawyers are generally separated. The comingling 
                                                             
48 For example, in England and Wales there were 132,636 practising solicitors as at November 2014; see 
Solicitors Regulation Authority “Regulated Population Statistics” <www.sra.org.uk>. There was also 15,585 
practising barristers as of December 2012; see Bar Standard Board Bar Barometer: Trends in the profile of the 
Bar (The General Council of the Bar of England and Wales, London, June 2014) at 13. 
49 Calculation made from figures in email from Christine Schofield, above n 45. It is interesting to note that this 
concentration has not changed significantly over time, 41% of lawyers were found in Auckland back in 1978, 
demonstrating that the concentration of lawyers has long been an feature of New Zealand’s legal profession: see 
Georgina Murray “New Zealand Lawyers: From Colonial GPs to the Servants of the Capital” in Richard L Abel 
and Philip S Lewis (eds) Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1988) 318 at 327.   
50 Calculation made from figures contained in email from Christine Schofield, above n 45.  
51 As at 1 February 2014, Wellington had 1 lawyer to every 84 inhabitants: see Geoff Adlam “Snapshot of the 
New Zealand Legal Profession 2014” LawTalk (New Zealand, 28 February 2014) at 11.  
52 Webb, above n 20, at 107. 
53  Ministry of Justice “Appointing Judges: A judicial appointments commission for New Zealand? – II Current 
New Zealand Situation” <www.justice.govt.nz> at [31]. 
54 Ministry of Justice, above n 53, at [37]. 
55 Ministry of Justice, above n 53, at [38]  
 Arbitrator Ethics in New Zealand: the New Zealand Approach to Ethical Obligations in International Arbitration  
15 
 
of judiciary with the legal profession reinforces the intimate nature of New Zealand’s legal 
community. 
There is an element of elitism within New Zealand’s legal community.56 Part of this stems from 
the fact that a law degree requires several years of tertiary education.  Lawyers and judges also 
earn relatively high wages especially in the highest levels of the profession.57  Furthermore 
there is “evidence of law running in families.”58 This point is demonstrated by the fact that 
many judges are themselves the children of judges and lawyers.59 These elements of elitism 
accentuate the intimacy of New Zealand’s legal community.  While these ‘elite’ characteristics 
are not unique to New Zealand, the small size of New Zealand makes them more pronounced.  
This is because a small total New Zealand population makes the elitism of certain members of 
society more conspicuous.  
 
2 Examples demonstrating the ethical culture of New Zealand’s legal community 
The ethical culture of New Zealand’s legal community can be further explored through the 
examples of Wilson J and Hesketh J. The actions of these judges and the legal community’s 
reactions illustrate the ethical culture of the legal profession in practice. It is this practical 
reality that is crucial to this paper’s investigation of the New Zealand context and its effect on 
understandings of arbitrators’ ethical obligations.  
(a) Judge Wilson   
The actions of Wilson J were the subject of discussion in Saxmere.60  As a Judge on the Court 
of Appeal, Wilson presided over a dispute between Saxmere Company Limited and the Wool 
                                                             
56 See Murray, above n 49, at 345. See also Jock Anderson “Make secretive judges open their wallets” (18 April 
2013) NBR <www.nbr.co.nz>, which describes the involvement of several judges and senior lawyers in the 
horse racing industry, this may be seen as one demonstration of wealth within the legal community.  
57 According to the 2013 Census, 48% of New Zealand’s lawyers have an income of over $100,000 compared to 
just 9% of New Zealand’s general population: see “Some interesting blips in lawyer incomes” LawTalk (New 
Zealand, 12 November 2014).  
58 Webb, above n 20, at 108; see also Murray, above n 49, at 331.  
59 Webb, above n 20, at 108. 
60 Saxmere Company Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Company Ltd [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35 
[Saxmere (No. 1)]; Saxmere Company Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Company Ltd (No 2) [2009] NZSC 
122, [2010] 1 NZLR 76 [Saxmere (No. 2)].  
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Board Disestablishment Company Limited.  The relationship between Wilson and Galbraith 
QC who represented the Wool Board was considered twice by the Supreme Court in 2009.  
Prior to hearing the appeal Wilson had “telephoned counsel for Saxmere [Francis Cooke QC]61 
and disclosed that he and Mr Galbraith had some mutual but unspecified business 
association.”62 The relationship disclosed was accepted by Saxmere and the case went to trial.  
The Court of Appeal found against Saxmere. 63  
Saxmere was granted leave to appeal this decision on the basis of Wilson’s “apparent bias” 
when new evidence emerged concerning Wilson and Galbraith’s relationship.64  Evidence 
before the Supreme Court established that Galbraith and Wilson “had been close personal 
friends for many years and had together with others been involved in the establishment of [a] 
horse stud.”65 Despite this, the court did not accept that Wilson was “beholden to Mr Galbraith 
because of the business dimension of their relationship.”66 The standard of apparent bias 
necessary to disqualify a judge had not been reached.67   
The Supreme Court subsequently reconsidered its decision when evidence emerged that Wilson 
was “in significant comparative debt” and owed Galbraith a significant sum of money.68  The 
Supreme Court found apparent bias on the basis of this new evidence.  
Saxmere gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to discuss the ethical obligations of 
impartiality and independence.69 The fact that the Supreme Court initially found no apparent 
bias is significant given Wilson and Galbraith’s close personal relationship and business 
connections.  It is possible that these facts would have been sufficient for a finding of apparent 
bias in other jurisdictions.  
                                                             
61 Sir David Gascoigne Decision of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner as to Three Complaints Concerning 
Justice Wilson (The Judicial Conduct Commission, 7 May 2010) at [36].  
62 Gerard McCoy “Judicial Recusal in New Zealand” in HP Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 322 at 328-329. 
63 McCoy, above n 62, at 328. 
64 McCoy, above n 62, at 329. 
65 McCoy, above n 62, at 331. 
66 Saxmere (No. 1)at [25] per Blanchard J.  
67 McCoy, above n 62, at 331. 
68 McCoy, above n 62, at 334. 
69 See further discussion on impartiality and independence at 21.   
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The potential for a personal relationship to give rise to apparent bias has been recognised by 
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd,70 
and by the High Court of Australia in Webb v R.71 While these cases did not specifically concern 
the relationship of a judge with counsel, they contain no indication that one person must be 
‘beholden’ to another which was the standard applied by the Supreme Court in Saxmere.  
The relationship between a judge and counsel was considered by the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal in R v Smith & Whiteway Fisheries Ltd.72 Apparent bias was not established in that 
case. However, while the pair had been law partners seven years prior and had “maintained a 
relationship after [the Judge’s] elevation to the bench” their relationship was not as close as 
that of Wilson and Galbraith.73  Discussion in the judgment indicates that a close friendship, or 
business relationship, would be less acceptable than the relationship that existed in the case. 
Furthermore there was no indication that a judge must be beholden to counsel before apparent 
bias is established.   
Saxmere also provides a general insight into New Zealand’s legal community.  Firstly, the facts 
of Saxmere confirm that New Zealand has a tight-knit legal community, especially in the upper 
levels of the profession and the judiciary.74  The phone call made by Wilson to Saxmere’s 
counsel demonstrates the level of contact between the judiciary and “the relatively small and 
                                                             
70 In Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451, at [25], the Lord Chief Justice stressed that 
every potential case of bias must be decided on the “facts and circumstances of the individual case” but 
contemplated that a “real danger of bias might well be thought to arise if there were personal friendship or 
animosity between the judge and any member of the public involved in the case.”  See also Christopher Forsyth 
“Judges, bias and recusal in the United Kingdom” in HP Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 361 at 371, where Locabail is described as the leading UK case 
on the applications of the test of bias.  
71 Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41. In this case Deane J recognised ‘association’ as a category that suggests bias. He 
said, at 74, that ‘association’ “consists of cases where the apprehension of prejudgment or other bias results from 
some direct or indirect relationship, experience or contact with a person or persons interested in, or otherwise 
involved in, the proceedings.” See also Colin Campbell “Judges, bias and recusal in Australia” in HP Lee (ed) 
Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 279 at 281.  
72 R v Smith & Whiteway Fisheries Ltd 133 NSR (2d) 50.  
73 See Lorne Sossin “Judges, bias and recusal in Canada” in HP Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative 
Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 301 at 313.  
74 “In New Zealand judges are appointed almost entirely from the practising legal profession. Most were senior 
barristers in active practice at the time of their appointment. Following their appointment judges regularly have 
lawyers appearing before them whom they knew when in practice and with whom they have sometimes had 
long associations. These associations have arisen from a variety of circumstances which include having been 
partners in the same law firm, practising barristers in the same chambers, or simply through appearing regularly 
in the same cases for different parties before courts and tribunals over the years. They regularly develop into 
personal friendships within this relatively small sector of the New Zealand legal community”: Saxmere (No. 1), 
above n 60, at [101] per McGrath.  
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congenial inner bar.”75 The events also highlighted the extent to which senior lawyers and 
judges (including the chief justice) were involved in the racing industry.76  
Wilson’s actions also demonstrate a relaxed attitude towards rules and procedures generally.  
According to the judicial conduct commissioner, disclosures should be made “either in open 
court or through the Court’s normal means of communication with the parties, for example, via 
the Registrar.”77 The disclosure via a phone call is a far cry from this standard. Wilson clearly 
identified that his relationship with Galbraith was at least a minor issue, but nothing that could 
not be fixed with a telephone call.78 Moreover, once the scandal came to light Wilson “admitted 
on television he breached court guidelines but only saw the guidelines later – claiming judges 
did not follow the guidelines in practice.”79  
Saxmere exposes the practical reality of judicial conduct and indicates a relaxed approach to 
ethical issues, particularly the obligations of impartiality and independence. Saxmere case 
could have been a wake-up call for the judiciary to take ethical obligations more seriously in 
the future. However, some commentators have suggested that the “sharp message from the 
Wilson affair” has been ignored.80 
(b) Judge Hesketh   
Hesketh J was charged with using a document with intent to defraud for filing false travel 
expense claims.81 The District Court judge pleaded guilty to the charge, resigned and was 
“subsequently struck off from the roll of barristers and solicitors.”82 While Hesketh’s actions 
were unethical, the legal community was “sympathetic and ultimately forgiving of this 
                                                             
75 McCoy, above n 62, at 328. 
76 Anderson, above n 56. Furthermore, according to McCoy, above n 62, at 329, Chief Justice Elias “recused 
herself from hearing the appeal as she and Wilson J were, ironically, in business together in yet another equine 
venture”.  
77 Gascoigne, above n 61, at [36].  
78 The Judicial Conduct Commissioner indicates that prior to Saxmere, “Justice Wilson and Mr Galbraith 
discussed what the Judge’s change in status might mean when Mr Galbraith appeared as counsel before him. 
They both concluded that there should not be any difficulty. But the Judge says that he was conscious of the 
possibility of some issue arising, at some stage”: Gascoigne, above n 61, at [34]. 
79 Anderson, above n 56.  
80 Anderson, above n 56. 
81 Webb, above n 20, at 113.  
82 Webb, above n 20, at 113. 
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judge.”83 Hesketh was permitted to remain at a firm as a law clerk,84 and was “restored to the 
roll of barristers and solicitors” only 20 months after being struck off.85  
While the legal profession did not condone Hesketh’s unethical behaviour, it also did not 
ostracise him for his actions. The sympathy shown towards Hesketh reflects the legal 
profession’s view of his behaviour. As the President of the Law Society put it:86  
[Hesketh] suffered heavily for his actions in falsely claiming travel expenses. Since the 
matter came to light, he has acted honourably and in a manner which befitted a judicial 
officer. He is entitled to considerable credit for this.  
This view of Hesketh must have been reinforced by the actions of Judge Beattie, who was also 
charged with filing false travel expense claims but “chose not to resign, and defended 
(successfully) the fraud charges brought.”87 
The reaction of the legal profession indicates a belief that “once a person has ‘fessed-up’ and 
paid the penalty he or she should be given the opportunity to redeem himself or herself and 
ought not to be unduly hampered by past conduct.”88 This ability to look beyond the 
misconduct of an individual - especially when they have demonstrated humility – is an 
important aspect of the profession’s ethical culture. This example suggests that once within 
New Zealand’s tight-knit legal profession unethical behaviour can be forgiven. One will not 
necessarily be regarded as unethical on the basis of a single indiscretion.  
C Conclusion: New Zealand’s Culture of Ethics  
A continuing perception of egalitarianism exists (rightly or wrongly) in New Zealand society. 
This cultural value favours the use of a common standard when judging people. An indiscretion 
does not necessarily mean that a person is considered a ‘bad’ person, especially where the 
individual recognises that they behaved unacceptably. This is because all people are liable to 
                                                             
83 Webb, above n 20, at 116.  
84 Webb, above n 20, at 115.  
85 Webb, above n 20, at 116. 
86  Webb, above n 20, at 115, which quotes the Decision of the New Zealand Law Society Disciplinary Tribunal, 
17 September 1997.  
87 Webb, above n 20, at 114. 
88 Webb, above n 20, at 116 
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commit the occasional indiscretion. This is demonstrated by the Hesketh J example.  This 
common standard approach to ethical behaviour must also apply to arbitrators.  
The ‘can-do’ attitude that exists in New Zealand affects the way New Zealanders view ‘ethical’ 
situations.89 A pragmatic approach to ethical obligations encourages individuals to ignore slight 
or potential issues in order to get a job done. While this is often a useful quality, it can be 
problematic when applied to ethical obligations. Wilson J’s actions demonstrate this issue as 
the Judge did not allow his relationship with counsel to complicate the hearing of a case. Wilson 
was aware that this relationship raised potential impartiality concerns yet he believed these 
issues could be resolved by a brief telephone call.  A pragmatic approach to ethical issues is 
likely to result in a more relaxed approach than is expected elsewhere. This is an issue for New 
Zealand arbitrators acting in jurisdictions that expect a stricter approach to ethics.  It also has 
implications for the enforcement of arbitrators’ ethical obligations in New Zealand.  
The small size and intimate nature of New Zealand’s legal profession has influenced the culture 
of ethics that exists within the profession. In particular it influences the approach taken to 
obligations of impartiality and independence. The tight-knit nature of New Zealand’s legal 
profession makes it impractical to raise concerns over impartiality and independence on the 
basis of every personal relationship. The nature of New Zealand’s legal profession requires a 
more lenient approach to impartiality and independence than is necessary in other jurisdictions. 
This culture of ethics in turn influences the obligations of impartiality and independence 
required of an arbitrator.  New Zealanders acting as arbitrators overseas and those enforcing 
ethical obligations in New Zealand are likely to demonstrate a relatively lenient approach to 
impartiality and independence.     
IV  Ethical Obligations of Arbitrators 
This part of the paper considers an arbitrator’s ethical obligations of impartiality and 
independence, competence, diligence, confidentiality and compliance with the arbitration 
agreement.  Additional ethical obligations that may exist in some contexts but are not universal 
are discussed in subpart F. The source of each ethical obligation is considered and an effort is 
made to understand how these obligations are coloured by New Zealand’s particular context.  
The New Zealand perspective offered in the discussion of these obligations is largely based on 
                                                             
89 For the purpose of this discussion it is necessary to make generalisations about New Zealand on a societal 
level. The approach described in this paper will not apply to all New Zealanders in the same way.   
 Arbitrator Ethics in New Zealand: the New Zealand Approach to Ethical Obligations in International Arbitration  
21 
 
the preceding analysis of New Zealand’s culture of ethics, the Arbitration Act 1996 and the 
AMINZ Code of Ethics.90  
The Arbitration Act regulates arbitration within New Zealand.91 The Act applies to both 
domestic and international arbitration conducted within New Zealand, although Schedule 2 
only applies to international arbitration through agreement of the parties.92 This paper is not 
concerned with Schedule 2 due to this domestic orientation.  Schedule 1 of the Arbitration Act 
is “essentially” the UNCITRAL Model Law.93  
AMINZ is a “voluntary association of arbitrators and mediators set up to support the growth of 
alternative dispute resolution in all its forms, including arbitration.”94 While other professional 
groups for arbitrators do exist, AMINZ plays a central role in arbitration in New Zealand.95  
AMINZ has a Code of Ethics containing 13 Ethical Statements with which its members must 
abide.96  Commentary and guidance accompany each Ethical Statement. Ethical obligations 
existing under this Code are important to the domestic landscape of arbitration.  
A  Impartiality and Independence  
Impartiality and independence are the fundamental obligations of an arbitrator.  Impartiality 
has been described as a “state of mind” that enables an arbitrator to address a dispute 
neutrally.97 Independence describes being “free from outside control.”98 Outside control may 
arise through an arbitrator’s relationship with one of the parties. While a subtle distinction 
exists between these terms, this distinction is not significant in practice.99 Rogers says that the 
“terms are used more or less interchangeably by institutions and courts, and their true meaning 
is determined more in their application than in their phraseology.”100  
                                                             
90 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc Code of Ethics (1 December 2011).  
91 Section 6. This means where the arbitral seat is in New Zealand: see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler 
“Globalisation of Arbitral Procedure” (2003) 36 Vand. J. Transnat’l L 1313 at 1315; see also Goldstajn, above n 
5, at 30. 
92 Section 6.  
93 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration 1985: with amendments as adopted in 2006 (United Nations publication, Vienna, 2008) 
[hereinafter referred to as the UNCITRAL Model Law]; see Law Commission, above n 93, at [2].  
94 Anthony Willy Arbitration (Brookers, Wellington, 2010), at 5.   
95 AMINZ is the professional group that commenters in New Zealand focus on: see for example Willy, above n 
94. Furthermore, LEADR, an alternative professional group that is present in New Zealand, started in Australia 
whereas AMINZ has always been a New Zealand organisation. For these reasons it better to use AMINZ as a 
NZ example to demonstrate ethics in New Zealand.  
96 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at 2.  
97 Rubino-Sammartano, above n 2, at 331. 
98 Oxford English Dictionary Online “Independence” <www.oxforddictionaries.com>. 
99 Rogers, above n 15, at 91.  
100 Rogers, above n 15, at 91. 
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The sources of these ethical obligations within the New Zealand context are considered first. 
The second section of this discussion addresses two issues of continuing uncertainty that plague 
the ethical obligations of impartiality and independence. The final section considers what 
exactly the obligations of impartiality and independence entail in the New Zealand context.  
1 Source of the ethical obligations and what they involve 
The Arbitration Act requires that all potential arbitrators disclose “any circumstances likely to 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to that person’s impartiality or independence.”101 This duty of 
disclosure endures throughout the arbitral proceedings; arbitrators must “disclose without 
delay” if such circumstances arise.102   
Obligations in the AMINZ Code of Ethics reflect those contained in New Zealand’s legislation. 
The key statement on impartiality and independence within the Code requires AMINZ 
members to “disclose any interest or relationship likely to affect impartiality or neutrality or 
which might create an appearance of partiality or bias.”103  
The duty of disclosure described in the Act and the Code is central to impartiality and 
independence.  The AMINZ ‘Guide to Arbitration’ says that “if the arbitrator has a relationship 
or interest it should be disclosed to the parties.”104  Even if an arbitrator believes they are 
independent and impartial, disclosure is necessary for justice to be seen to be done. 
The obligations of impartiality and independence extend beyond disclosure; where the 
“arbitrator is not personally satisfied that he or she can act with complete impartiality, the 
appointment must be declined or the arbitration discontinued.”105 This is the case even where 
full disclosure is made to the parties and no objections are raised.106  This situation is 
demonstrated in the International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration.107 The Guidelines categorise conflicts of interest and includes a non-
waivable red list of situations where conflicts of interests cannot be waived by the parties.108   
                                                             
101 Schedule 1, s 12(1).  
102 Schedule 1, s 12(1). 
103 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at Ethical Statement 2.  
104 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc Guide to Arbitration (July 2004) at 4.  
105 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 104, at 4. 
106 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 104, at 4. 
107 IBA Guidelines 2014, above n 16.  
108 IBA Guidelines 2014, above n 16, at 6.  The guidelines are significant as they convert qualitative standards 
into quantitative standards: see Rogers, above n 15, at 94. 
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The Arbitration Act and the AMINZ Code of Ethics contain some further statements affirming 
the obligations of impartiality and independence. The Act demands that “parties shall be treated 
with equality” during the arbitral proceedings.109 Unequal treatment of parties is likely to 
emerge from the partiality or bias of the arbitrator. 
The Code states that all AMINZ members “should uphold the integrity and fairness of the 
relevant dispute resolution process.”110 Impartiality and independence are inherent to fairness.  
Members must also “make decisions in a just, independent and considered manner.”111   
Although this discussion has focused the sources of these obligations in the New Zealand 
context, the obligations of impartiality and independence are acknowledged internationally. As 
Rogers explains, “Despite the range of sources and the variations in their application, there is 
surprisingly broad agreement about the general substance of arbitrator’s ethical obligations.”112  
All arbitrators should be familiar with the obligations of impartiality and independence. This 
is because “all international arbitration rules impose such a duty.”113 However, understandings 
of these obligations can fluctuate depending on the context. This paper specifically concerns 
the New Zealand context and its effect on the way New Zealand arbitrators, and those enforcing 
ethical obligations within New Zealand, understand these ostensibly universal obligations.  
2 Continuing uncertainty  
Although obligations of impartiality and independence are well accepted, uncertainty continues 
over certain aspects of these obligations. The first area of uncertainty discussed is whether there 
is a duty to investigate. The second relates to party-appointed arbitrators and how the 
obligations of impartiality and independence apply to them.  
(a) A duty to investigate 
The duty to investigate is a recent development in the ethical obligations applying to arbitrators 
in international arbitration.114 The duty to investigate is part of the duty of disclosure. 
Arbitrators have a duty to investigate possible conflicts of interests and may not simply “turn 
a blind-eye” to the conflict, a practice which occurred in the past.115  
                                                             
109 Schedule 1, s 18. 
110 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at Ethical Statement 3.  
111 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at Ethical Statement 10.  
112 Rogers, above n 15, at 90. 
113 Rogers, above n 15, at 241.  
114 Rogers, above n 15, at 248. 
115 Rogers, above n 15, at 248.  
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While the duty to investigate is generally accepted by arbitral institutions at the international 
level, national law appears to be lagging behind.116  Neither the Arbitration Act nor the AMINZ 
Code of Ethics mention any to duty to investigate possible conflicts of interest. Whether the 
duty of disclosure involves a duty to investigate has not yet been considered by the New 
Zealand courts. 
Although obligations of impartiality and independence found in New Zealand do not expressly 
include a duty to investigate, the duty may be implied by New Zealand courts.117  New Zealand 
has shown a deference to international rules in other areas of arbitration. For example, the 
Arbitration Act is largely an adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law.  If New Zealand courts 
are asked to consider whether the obligations of impartiality and independence include a duty 
to investigate, it is probable that this duty will be recognised.  
(b) Party-appointed arbitrators          
As foreshadowed in discussion on the role of an arbitrator, the existence of unilaterally 
appointed arbitrators continues to complicate matters of arbitrator impartiality and 
independence.118 This complexity stems from the relationship a party-appointed arbitrator has 
with ‘their’ party.119   
The existence of party-appointed arbitrators sits uncomfortably with the ethical obligations of 
impartiality and independence. The fact that arbitrators are chosen by one of the parties 
threatens the appearance of independence. Parties may use unilateral appointments to choose 
an arbitrator they believe to be ‘on their team’. This may be someone the party knows 
personally, or someone the party expects will share their view of the dispute. Failing to use 
unilateral appointments in this way may disadvantage a party. 
How can the obligations of impartiality and independence be reconciled with the existence of 
party-appointed arbitrators? There is no single answer to this question. Paulsson argues that 
reconciliation is unattainable and that the use of party-appointed arbitrators should be 
abandoned.120 Some jurisdictions have accepted a more permissive attitude to the obligations 
of party-appointed arbitrators.121 Rogers approaches this matter by assessing the exact role of 
                                                             
116 Rogers, above n 15, at 249. 
117 Courts in other jurisdictions have done this: see Rogers, above n 15, at 249.  
118 At 6.  
119 The process of party-appointed arbtirators is expressly provided for in the Arbitration Act, Sch 1, art 11(3). 
120 Paulsson, above n 10, at 279.  
121 Rubino-Sammartano, above n 2, at 343.  
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a party-appointed arbitrator. She denies that party-appointed arbitrators are exempted from 
impartiality and independence obligations and instead argues that their obligations should be 
understood in light of “the differentiated role assigned to party-appointed arbitrators.”122 
The uncertainty surrounding party-appointed arbitrators internationally is not apparent in the 
obligations of impartiality and independence found in New Zealand. For example, the 
Arbitration Act allows the impartiality and independence of a party-appointed arbitrator to be 
challenged by either party to an arbitration.123 Commentary to the Act indicates that in New 
Zealand, “The requirement for arbitrator to be completely impartial and unbiased applies to 
sole arbitrator and two [unilaterally appointed] arbitrators equally.”124 While New Zealand case 
law on the impartiality and independence of party-appointed arbitrators concerns domestic 
arbitration, the same approach can be expected to apply to international arbitration.  
3 What does impartiality and independence mean in the New Zealand context? 
While impartiality and independence are universally recognised obligations in international 
arbitration, this paper argues that understandings of ethical obligations within New Zealand are 
inevitably coloured by the national context. Impartiality and independence are generally 
assessed through qualitative standards. The use of qualitative standards allows for “significant 
discretion in interpreting how that standard applies.”125 In light of this, it is necessary to 
consider how the New Zealand context influences interpretations of impartiality and 
independence.  
Commentary provided to the AMINZ Code of Ethics indicates a strict duty of disclosure in 
relation to impartiality and independence. Guidance stipulates that disclosure should be made 
where there is any doubt over whether an objective observer may perceive partiality or bias.126 
It also states that disclosures should “be comprehensive so that parties are fully and fairly 
informed of the relevant facts which might lead to a recusal request.”127  
While the rules provided on disclosure seem strict, Saxmere is a useful example in assessing 
how impartiality and independence are treated in New Zealand. First of all, Saxmere 
                                                             
122 Rogers, above n 15, at 335.  
123 Schedule 1, art 12(2). See also Philip Green, Babara Hunt and Tomas Kennedy-Grant Green and Hunt on 
Arbitration Law and Practise (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [ARSch1.12.08(2)]; see Grey District Council v 
Banks [2003] NZAR 487 at [44], and Banks v Grey District Council [2004] 2 NZLR 19 (CA) at [29].  
124 Green, Hunt and Kennedy-Grant, above n 123, at [ARSch1.12.08(2)]; see also Tolmarsh Developments Ltd v 
Stobbs HC Auckland M809/90, 20 September 1990 at 8.  
125 Rogers, above n 15, at 244.  
126 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at 6.  
127 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at 6.  
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demonstrated that judicial guidelines are not always referred to. This suggests that the strict 
instructions AMINZ provides for its members may not be followed in every case. 
New Zealand arbitrators and those enforcing the ethical obligations of arbitrators in New 
Zealand are likely to approach the obligations of impartiality and independence in a way that 
seems cavalier to those unfamiliar with the New Zealand context.  This conclusion flows from 
the intimate nature of New Zealand’s legal profession which requires a relaxed approach to 
impartiality and independence obligations, as well as the pragmatic attitude to problem-solving 
that exists in New Zealand.  Ethical obligations are respected in New Zealand yet the number 
of situations that raise impartiality or independence concerns in New Zealand is relatively 
limited.   
It should be noted that this relaxed approach to impartiality and independence relates solely to 
situations where bias is alleged to arise through a relationship. It is also possible for impartiality 
issues to arise where an arbitrator has a financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding.  
There is no reason suspect that New Zealand’s approach in such cases would be seen as relaxed 
by outsiders. As Cooke P confirms in Auckland Casino Ltd v Casino Control Authority, “there 
is no doubt that any direct interest, however small, in the subject of the inquiry disqualifies a 
person from acting as a judge in that matter.”128  
B  Competence  
According to Rogers, “Arbitrators also have general obligations of competence and diligence, 
which are specified in some ethical rules.”129 In relation to competence she explains that an 
arbitrator “should not accept an appointment unless actually possessing the requisite skills.”130    
Where parties have specified certain qualifications for their arbitration, a challenge may be 
made on the ground that an arbitrator “does not possess qualifications agreed to by the 
parties.”131 This allows parties to control whether their dispute is arbitrated by an expert or not, 
for example by an “architect or a civil engineer”.132 The obligation that an arbitrator is 
competent in the manner specified by the parties has not led to difficulties in practice.133  
                                                             
128  Auckland Casino Ltd v Casino Control Authority [1995] 1 NZLR 142 (CA) at 9; see also Green, Hunt and 
Kennedy-Grant, above n 123, at [ARSch1.12.05].  
129 Rogers, above n 15, at 96. 
130 Rogers, above n 15, at 96. 
131 Arbitration Act, sch 1, art 12(2).  
132 Willy, above n 94, at 68.  
133 Willy, above n 94, at 68.  
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While it is easy to determine an arbitrator’s competence in relation to qualifications specified 
by the parties, the situation is not as clear cut in relation to competence generally. The first 
statement in the AMINZ Ethical Code states that: “Prior to accepting an appointment a member 
should have undertaken training and have appropriate experience in the relevant dispute 
resolution process.”134 In determining whether this ethical obligation is satisfied, commentary 
to the Code advises members to ask themselves: “How would my competence to undertake this 
task be judged by my peers.”135 
One way of assessing competence is by reference to the AMINZ membership structure.  
AMINZ provides several types of membership including Student; Affiliate; Associate and 
Fellow.136  An ‘Affiliate’ describes someone who is “interested in dispute resolution but not 
qualified.”137 On the other hand, an ‘Associate’ is both “qualified and interested in dispute 
resolution.”138 Fellowship is granted to AMINZ members who “by virtue of his or her training 
and/or experience and his or her personal qualities, demonstrates competence at the date of 
admission”.139   
To become an Associate of AMINZ “applicants must be able to show that…they have 
sufficient knowledge of dispute resolution through his or her experience and/or training to fulfil 
the syllabus requirements.”140 The syllabus requirements may be evidenced through training at 
the ‘Massey University Dispute Resolution Centre’,141 or through the University of Auckland, 
the University of Waikato or Victoria University.142 The AMINZ website also notes that 
“sometimes a mix of experience and training will fulfil the syllabus.”143 The syllabus clearly 
requires a basic understanding of New Zealand’s legal system.144  
AMINZ appears to require high levels of competence from its Associates. As Associates are 
‘qualified’ in dispute resolution, the education and training required to become an Associate 
indicates what is necessary to fulfil Code’s competence requirements. While no arbitrator is 
required to be part of AMINZ, the professional group’s importance within New Zealand means 
                                                             
134 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at Ethical Statement 1.  
135 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at 5. 
136 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc “Membership” <www.aminz.org.nz>. 
137 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc “Associate” <www.aminz.org.nz>. 
138 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 137.  
139 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc “Fellow” <www.aminz.org.nz>. 
140 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 137.  
141 Massey University offers a Graduate Diploma in Business Studies (Dispute Resolution).  
142 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 137.  
143 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 137.  
144 The Education Syllabus for Associateship may be found at Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New 
Zealand Inc, above n 137.  
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that its high competence standards are likely to influence the general approach to this ethical 
obligation in New Zealand. This is especially so given that standards are unlikely to vary 
significantly within New Zealand’s tight-knit legal community.  
New Zealand is generally regarded as producing lawyers of high calibre.  According to Walton: 
“It is a common observation in many fields that New Zealand is a crèche for international 
talent; none more so than in the law”.145  If New Zealand’s professional standards are generally 
acceptable overseas, the New Zealand approach to arbitrator competence should also be of an 
acceptable standard.   
C   Diligence  
Diligence relates to the way an arbitrator approaches the proceeding at hand.  According to 
Rogers, diligence is a general obligation of arbitrators.146 Her explanation of diligence 
incorporates an element of efficiency; an arbitrator must be “able to accommodate the 
arbitration in his or her schedule.”  
While the Arbitration Act does not address the obligation of diligence specifically, it does 
require that arbitrators “act without undue delay”.147 This means that arbitrators have a 
“statutory obligation to positively drive the process through to a conclusion.”148 This reflects 
the requirement of efficiency that diligence embraces.  
The obligation of diligence is specifically included in the AMINZ Code of Ethics which 
requires the proceeding to be “conducted with due diligence.”149 The commentary to this 
ethical statement refers to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Sixth Edition 2007 which 
defines diligence to mean:150  
1  “careful attention; heedfulness, caution 
2 the quality of being diligent; industry, assiduity  
3  speed, dispatch, haste”. 
                                                             
145 Walton, above n 18, at 3.  
146 Rogers, above n 15, at 96. 
147 Schedule 1, art 14(1).  
148 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at 10.  
149 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at Ethical Statement 5.  
150 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at 12. 
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This ethical statement is described as “an injunction for the member to at all times conduct the 
process with care and applying persistence and effort in doing so.”151 
The element of efficiency that diligence encompasses is further recognised when the AMINZ 
Code states that potential arbitrators “should accept the appointment only if that have the ability 
to conduct the process in an efficient and timely manner.”152 In doing so, the Code of Ethics 
advises arbitrators to follow the courts’ example by establishing arbitration timetables and 
“insisting on adherence where reasonable to do so.”153  
An arbitrator should adhere to any time limits specified in the arbitration agreement.154  Where 
time limits have not been set, it may be difficult to determine the “ideal duration” of an 
arbitration.155 This is a matter of controversy and will depend on the nature and circumstances 
of the proceeding.156  
While efficiency is important, the obligation of diligence also obliges arbitrators to take care 
while considering a dispute. Ethical Statement 10 states that “a member should make decisions 
in a just, independent and considered manner.”157 The commentary explains that the 
‘considered requirement:158 
… is a reminder that although members are charged with conducting the process in an 
efficient and timely manner there is an overarching duty to give the matter careful 
thought. There is an obligation to take into account and weigh the arguments advanced 
on behalf of each of the parties making the determination.  
There is nothing inherent in New Zealand’s culture of ethics to suggest that New Zealand’s 
approach to the ethical obligation of diligence differs significantly from other jurisdictions. If 
anything, a pragmatic approach to an arbitral proceeding may enhance efficiency by preventing 
trivial matters delaying an effective outcome. While trivial matters may be overlooked, a 
pragmatic approach does not mean that the care required in considering substantive matters is 
abandoned. The diligence of New Zealand arbitrators acting in international arbitrations is 
likely to meet standards expected in other jurisdictions. Similarly, the attitude of those 
                                                             
151 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at 12. 
152 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at Ethical Statement 4.  
153 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at 10. 
154 Willy, above n 94, at 86.   
155 Rubino-Sammartano, above n 2, at 548.  
156 Rubino-Sammartano, above n 2, at 548. 
157 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at Ethical Statement 10.  
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enforcing the ethical obligation of diligence in New Zealand is unlikely to attract criticism from 
foreign observers.  
D  Confidentiality  
Parties to an arbitration agreement generally value the confidentiality that arbitration offers. 
However, while parties may have “pronounced and precise expectations” in relation to 
confidentiality, Rogers considers this “one area where formal ethical regulation remains 
underdeveloped.”159 While the regulation of arbitrator confidentiality may be generally 
underdeveloped, New Zealand offers “statutory protection of confidentiality in arbitration 
unless the parties agree otherwise.”160 Provisions addressing confidentiality in the Arbitration 
Act and the AMINZ Code of Ethics are highly prescriptive.  
Since amendment in 2007,161 the Arbitration Act has required that “an arbitral tribunal conduct 
the arbitral proceeding in private.”162 While this provision suggests that privacy is mandatory 
it remains subject to the parties’ agreement.163 Parties to the arbitration may agree that others 
can view proceedings.164 
Section 14B is the starting point for confidentiality in the Arbitration Act.  It states that “Every 
arbitration agreement to which this section applies is deemed to provide that the parties and the 
arbitral tribunal must not disclose confidential information.”165 Arbitrators are expressly 
subject to this confidentiality provision.166 ‘Confidential information’ is defined widely to 
mean “information that relates to the arbitral proceedings or to an award made in those 
proceedings.”167  
                                                             
159 Matti S Kurkela Due Process in International Commercial Arbitration (Oceana Publications Inc, New York, 
2005) at 189.  
160 New Zealand Dispute Resolution Centre “International Dispute Resolution” <www.nzdrc.co.nz>. 
161 Arbitration Amendment Act 2007.  
162 Section 14A.  
163 Green, Hunt and Kennedy-Grant, above n 123, at [AR14A.02].  
164 The privacy of the arbitral process may also be overridden by an order of the court if the principle of open 
justice demands it: see Green, Hunt and Kennedy-Grant, above n 123, at [AR14A.02].  
165 Section 14B(1).  
166 Contrast this to the situation that existed before the Arbitration Amendment Act 2007, where confidentiality 
applied only to the parties to the proceedings, not to the arbitrators: see Green, Hunt and Kennedy-Grant, above 
n 123, [AR14.05(1)]. 
167 Paragraph (a) of the definition of “confidential information” in s 2 of the Arbitration Act.  
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The starting point for confidentiality established in s 14B is subject to s 14C which explains 
when a party or the arbitral tribunal may disclose information.168 Willy provides a summary of 
the exceptions found in s 14C:169  
Section 14C allows disclosure in a number of as yet untested circumstances. These are  
(1) disclosure is “no more than is necessary” and is made “to a professional or other 
adviser of any of the parties”;  
(2) disclosure is made “in accordance with a court order or subpoena”;  
(3) disclosure is authorised or required by law. (except the 1996 Act);  
(4) disclosure is “required by a competent regulatory body (including the New Zealand 
Exchange Limited)”;  
(5) disclosure made pursuant to an order made by the arbitral tribunal; or the High 
Court or pursuant to s 14D or 14E. 
Questions regarding the disclosure of confidential information by a party are referred to the 
arbitral tribunal which has the power to “make or refuse to make an order allowing all or any 
of the parties to disclose confidential information.”170 While it is the parties who seek to 
disclose information, the power the tribunal is given regarding disclosure is significant.   
The obligation of confidentiality is clearly set out in the AMINZ Code of Ethics. Ethical 
Statement 6 states that:171  
A member, subject to legal obligations or other recognised expectations must observe 
the duty to protect the privacy of those participating in the process, and the 
confidentiality of all elements of the process.  
Ethical Statement 7 adds that:172  
Confidential information received by as member as a third party neutral, or in some 
other role, in the process may not be:  
1. used to the member’s personal advantage, or  
2. in the absence of party consent, be used in other separate process 
involving one of the original parties and a third party.   
                                                             
168 Section 14B(2). 
169 Willy, above n 94, at 128.  
170 Section 14D.  
171 Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at Ethical Statement 6. 
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While the Arbitration Act contains prescriptive rules governing confidentiality, Willy criticises 
the 2007 amendments. In his opinion, the Arbitration Amendment Act removed “the blanket 
confidentiality to arbitral proceedings” that previously existed, only to replace it with “a regime 
which removes all certainty that material and evidence produced and given at arbitration will 
remain confidential.”173 This criticism is directed at the uncertainty created over whether 
information will remain confidential given the exceptions to confidentiality in s 14C. It does 
not mean that an arbitrator’s ethical obligation of confidentiality is uncertain.  
The prescriptiveness of the Arbitration Act is reflected in the Code of Ethics. Commentary to 
Ethical Statement 6 (above) describes when disclosure will be permitted: 174 
Disclosure is only permitted under the most limited of circumstances. Examples of such 
circumstances include: 
 
1 Where disclosure is required by law, or by order of a court. 
2 Where the member reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent a 
serious risk to the health, safety or welfare of any person. 
3 Where the intention to commit a crime is disclosed, and the member has reasonable 
grounds for believing that the crime will be committed, the member then has a duty 
to report that intent to the appropriate authority. 
4 Where a party has expressly authorised a disclosure to another and where that 
information is solely held by that party. Where the information is held by more 
than one party, then all parties having the information must authorise the 
disclosure. 
5 Where it is necessary to protect the interests of a party where the member comes 
to appreciate that there are genuine incapacity issues applying to a party in the 
process. 
6 Where disclosure is necessary to give effect to any insurance cover arrangements, 
or collection of unpaid professional fees and disbursements incurred in the course 
of the process. 
7 Where disclosure is necessary to respond to or to defend a complaint, allegations, 
claim or other form of proceeding against the member brought by a party to the 
process. Disclosure is limited to matters solely concerned with the complainant 
party in the absence of written consent to waive confidentiality by any other 
participating party. 
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8 Where any of these circumstances apply the disclosure as an exception to this 
Ethical Statement is only allowed to the minimum extent reasonably necessary to 
discharge the exception.  
 
The prescriptive approach taken to the ethical obligation of confidentiality in New Zealand is 
interesting. Guidance provided in the Act and the Code leaves limited scope for arbitrators to 
exercise their judgement in determining whether disclosure is acceptable. Furthermore, the 
New Zealand legal profession requires a duty of confidentiality.175 The ethical obligation of 
confidentiality is therefore well-recognised and understood within New Zealand.  
 
The New Zealand context supports a strict approach to confidentiality. The confidentiality of 
arbitration is protected and may only be departed from in certain circumstances. The way in 
which confidentiality has been dealt with in New Zealand means that arbitrators from New 
Zealand are likely to respect confidentiality within arbitral proceedings. A robust approach to 
the enforcement of confidentiality may also be expected within international arbitration seated 
in New Zealand in light of this prescriptive legislative protection.  
 
E  Compliance with the Arbitration Agreement  
Parties to an arbitration agreement have significant control over the procedure.  The Arbitration 
Act provides that “Subject to the provisions of [Schedule one] the parties are free to agree on 
the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings.”176 Given 
the importance of party control within international arbitration, it is not surprising that 
“arbitrators have a duty to conduct the arbitral proceedings in accordance with the parties’ 
arbitration agreement” as well as any “subsequent procedural agreements between the 
parties.”177   
This duty is contractual in nature given that an arbitrator is appointed by parties to conduct an 
arbitration in accordance with their arbitration agreement. However, this duty has also been 
described as an ethical obligation.178 Therefore, the duty of compliance is included in this 
discussion of ethical obligations for the sake of completeness.  
                                                             
175 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, ch 8; see also Arbitrators’ 
and Mediator’s Institute of New Zealand Inc, above n 90, at 13.  
176 Schedule 1, art 19(1).  
177 Rogers, above n 15, at 96. 
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In New Zealand the legislature and the courts have demonstrated respect for the principle of 
party control over arbitral proceedings.  For example, the Arbitration Act was intended to 
“break with the sometimes heavy-handed regulation of the arbitral process by the High 
Court”.179 When a court is required to consider an arbitral proceedings it will generally be to 
ensure that the arbitrator carried out the proceeding “within the terms of the agreement.”180  
The present attitude of the courts is to “lend uncritical support to the construction of the 
agreement to arbitrate.”181  
The attitude displayed by New Zealand’s legislature and courts demonstrates significant 
respect for party control and the integrity of the arbitration agreement. This suggests that the 
ethical obligation that an arbitrator complies with the arbitration agreement is well entrenched 
in New Zealand. New Zealand arbitrators involved in international arbitrations can be expected 
to comply with the terms of the arbitration agreement. Similarly, enforcement bodies within 
New Zealand can be expected to insist on compliance.     
F  Additional Ethical Obligations  
Some national systems impose ethical duties on arbitrators beyond those generally accepted at 
the international level. For example, the national laws of some jurisdictions “impose certain 
obligations on arbitrators when they suspect corruption or are confronted with criminal 
wrongdoing.”182 Likewise, parties from different national legal systems may have different 
expectations of an arbitrator when it comes to proposing, or refraining to propose a 
settlement.183 It is not possible to examine all these additional ethical obligations within this 
paper. While New Zealand does not impose additional ethical obligations it is important to 
remember that additional ethical obligations may apply in some contexts.  
V  Consequences for New Zealand Arbitrators Working Overseas  
While New Zealand may not be a common seat for international arbitration at present, New 
Zealanders are nonetheless involved in international arbitration overseas. As at 1 February 
2014, 502 lawyers holding a New Zealand practising certificate were based overseas.184  Forty-
                                                             
179 Willy, above n 94, at 14.  
180 Willy, above n 94, at 14.  
181 Willy, above n 94, at 14. While Willy is referring to English cases he says, at 19, that it may “be assumed 
that the development of the law in the United Kingdom relating to the interpretation of agreement is applicable 
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two per cent of these individuals (212) were in England; 196 in London specifically.185 London 
is a popular location for arbitration; it is therefore likely that a proportion of New Zealand 
lawyers based in London are involved in international arbitration.  
The above numbers only serve to demonstrate that legally trained New Zealanders often 
relocate to foreign jurisdictions. It is entirely possible for a New Zealander to work as an 
arbitrator overseas without possessing a New Zealand practicing certificate. While it is difficult 
to determine the numbers exactly, New Zealand is regarded as having “a relatively high number 
of highly regarded practitioners working internationally in arbitration.”186 Some New 
Zealanders who have been recognised for their work in international arbitration include Audley 
Sheppard,187 Stephen Jagusch,188 Wendy Miles,189 Anthony Sinclair,190 James Hosking, 191 
Jason Fry,192 and Peter Thorp.193  
New Zealanders working overseas need to be sensitive to the fact that perceptions of ethical 
issues vary between cultures. New Zealand’s culture of ethics may prevent New Zealand 
arbitrators identifying ethical issues in situations that those from different backgrounds would 
regard as ‘ethical’.  Subpart A of this section illustrates situations in which New Zealand 
arbitrators must exercise heightened awareness to ethical issues. Subpart B considers how to 
prevent New Zealand’s culture of ethics from disadvantaging New Zealanders involved in 
international arbitration overseas.  
A  Situations for Heightened Awareness  
The primary area in which New Zealand arbitrators must exercise caution is in relation to the 
fundamental ethical obligations of impartiality and independence. The size and intimacy of 
New Zealand’s legal community is the most important factor distinguishing New Zealand from 
other jurisdictions. Cities that have typically emerged as popular locations of arbitration are 
generally international trade centres and have larger populations than New Zealand as a whole.  
                                                             
185 Adlam, above n 51, at 14. 
186 Walton, above n 18, at 3. 
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It has been argued above that the approach to impartiality and independence taken in New 
Zealand may appear relaxed to those outside New Zealand. It is advisable that New Zealand 
arbitrators exercise heightened awareness when considering how people from larger, less 
intimate communities could view their relationships and interests. This is a situation where 
pragmatic decision-making should be set aside and a more cautious approach adopted.  
The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration are a very useful tool 
for New Zealand arbitrators. The IBA Guidelines divide conflicts of interests into “quantitative, 
fact-based categories”.194 These Guidelines “help reduce ambiguities and much of the 
guesswork for arbitrators in deciding whether to make a disclosure.”195 New Zealand arbitrators 
should have a working knowledge of the IBA Guidelines and may refer to them when 
considering the ethical obligations of impartiality and independence.  
New Zealand arbitrators should be as well prepared as any to fulfil their ethical obligations of 
compliance, competence, diligence and confidentiality. They should nevertheless remain aware 
of New Zealand’s pragmatic attitude and ensure that this attitude does not affect their approach 
to these ethical obligations. Furthermore, arbitrators should familiarise themselves with any 
additional ethical obligations that apply in the country they are operating in.  
Arbitrators should also recognise that the New Zealand legal profession displays a relatively 
forgiving attitude towards breaches of ethical obligations as seen in the case of Judge Hesketh. 
Such attitudes may not exist in foreign jurisdictions where an arbitrator is practising. A lapse 
of judgment leading to a breach of an ethical obligation may have a lasting impact on ones’ 
international arbitration career.  
B  Preventing New Zealand’s Culture of Ethics from Disadvantaging Arbitrators 
It is crucial that New Zealand arbitrators acting overseas are aware that their understanding of 
ethical obligations may be influenced by New Zealand’s culture of ethics. Where an arbitrator 
is aware that different ethical expectations exist, they are able to consider what behaviour is 
expected of them in an international arbitration. On the other hand, an arbitrator who is unaware 
that ethical obligations may be interpreted differently will not question their own understanding 
of their ethical obligations. In such cases, New Zealand arbitrators will simply apply a New 
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Zealand understanding of ethical obligations without considering the context they are working 
in.   
Education can be used to increase the cultural awareness of New Zealand arbitrators.  An 
awareness of different ethical cultures could be incorporated into existing courses on legal 
ethics. Discussion of ethics in arbitration does not necessarily require detailed discussion of 
ethical standards elsewhere. It is sufficient to acknowledge that ‘ethics’ may change depending 
on context and to demonstrate this by highlighting some peculiarities that exist in other 
jurisdictions. An arbitrator who appreciates that ethics is contextual can seek advice on ethical 
obligations when working in an unfamiliar context.   
It is also appropriate to consider ethical culture in courses dealing with arbitration. New 
Zealanders seeking a career as an international arbitrator may be expected to participate in 
courses on arbitration, or dispute resolution more generally. If such courses address the fact 
that ethical obligations may vary between countries, students will be better prepared for a career 
in international arbitration.  
VI Consequences Where New Zealand is the Seat of Arbitration 
New Zealand is not presently a seat of choice for international arbitrations.  Nevertheless, there 
is interest in the country becoming a regional hub for international arbitration in the future.   
New Zealand has significant cultural and trade ties to other countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
and is well-placed to serve as an arbitral location for disputes involving parties in this area.196 
If this vision for New Zealand is to be realised, it is prudent to examine how New Zealand’s 
ethical culture may apply to international arbitrations seated in New Zealand.  
Subpart A describes the current state of international arbitration in New Zealand. Subpart B 
considers how an arbitrator’s ethical obligations can be enforced in New Zealand. This 
information is necessary when considering how New Zealand’s culture of ethics may be 
imposed upon international arbitration. Subpart C considers how New Zealand’s attitude 
towards an arbitrator’s ethical obligations may be viewed by those outside New Zealand.  
Subpart D addresses the question ‘where to from here?’  
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A  New Zealand as a Seat of International Arbitration  
As previously stated, New Zealand does not attract much business as a seat of international 
arbitration. However, it is clear that AMINZ seeks to encourage international arbitration in 
New Zealand. It has been said that:197  
AMINZ sees its role as promoting our arbitrators [those that are members of AMINZ] 
and New Zealand more generally, and creating a conducive environment for regional 
arbitration. Our ultimate objective it for NZ to be a seat of choice for international 
dispute resolution, and in particular international commercial arbitration, with all the 
necessary facilities and resources at its disposal. 
New Zealand’s only international arbitral institution - the New Zealand International 
Arbitration Centre (NZIAC) - was established in 2013. The NZIAC describes itself as 
providing an “effective forum for the settlement of international trade, commerce, investment 
and cross-border disputes in the Australasian/Pan Pacific region”.198 The recent establishment 
of the NZIAC suggests that international arbitration is set to increase in New Zealand.  
While the NZIAC is an interesting emergence in New Zealand’s international arbitration 
landscape, it does not necessarily mean that the NZIAC will administer all international 
arbitrations taking place in New Zealand. New Zealand may be the seat of ad hoc arbitration. 
It is also possible for New Zealand to be chosen as a seat of an international arbitration 
administered by an arbitral institution based elsewhere.  
B  Enforcing Ethical Obligations in New Zealand 
While is it clear that arbitrators have certain ethical obligations, these obligations mean nothing 
unless they are adequately enforced.  In assessing the effect of New Zealand’s ethical culture 
on New Zealand’s performance as a seat of international arbitration, one must understand how 
the ethical obligations of arbitrators are enforced in New Zealand. Enforcement through the 
arbitral institution is considered first, followed by enforcement through professional groups 
and finally enforcement of ethical obligations through the New Zealand courts. 
1 Enforcement by the arbitral institution 
Arbitral institutions have the capacity to ensure that the proceedings they administer accord 
with institutional rules. The NZIAC Rules for International Commercial Arbitration regulate 
                                                             
197 Walton, above n 18, at 5.  
198 New Zealand Dispute Resolution Centre, above n 160.  
 Arbitrator Ethics in New Zealand: the New Zealand Approach to Ethical Obligations in International Arbitration  
39 
 
arbitrations administered through the NZIAC. While the arbitral institution does not have an 
ethical code of conduct, the ethical obligations of arbitrators discussed above are reflected in 
these rules.  
The NZIAC Rules explicitly require impartiality and independence. They state that: 199 
Any Arbitral Tribunal conducting an arbitration under these Rules shall be impartial 
and independent of the Parties. No arbitrator appointed to an Arbitral Tribunal shall act 
as an advocate for any Party and each arbitrator shall, from the time of his or her 
appointment, assume a continuing duty to immediately disclose to the Parties and 
NZIAC, any circumstances arising in the future which may be likely to give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to that arbitrator’s impartiality or independence in the eyes of any 
of the Parties, until the Arbitration is concluded. 
Potential arbitrators have the duty to disclose “any circumstances past or present likely to give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to his or her impartiality or independence in the eyes of any of the 
Parties.”200 This substantially reflects the legislative requirements previously discussed in this 
paper.201 Circumstances giving rise to “justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence” may form the basis of a challenge to any arbitrator.202  
The NZIAC maintains a ‘Panel’ and an ‘approved list’ of arbitrators.203 The institution can 
ensure the competence of arbitrators on these lists through self-regulation.  Where the person 
approached for appointment is not on the Panel or approved list of arbitrators, that person “shall 
furnish to the Registrar a written resume of his or her past and present professional positions 
and experience as an arbitrator”.204 This allows the NZIAC to ensure the competence of any 




                                                             
199 New Zealand Dispute Resolution Centre “NZIAC Rules for International Commercial Arbitration” 
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The NZIAC Rules requires arbitral tribunals to: 205 
…adopt  such  procedures  and  give  such  directions  and  rulings  as may  be required 
to ensure that the process for the determination of the matters in dispute is fair, prompt, 
and cost effective…  
This must be done in accordance with the Purpose of the NZIAC Rules which is:206  
 …to ensure that Arbitration is conducted fairly, promptly, and cost effectively, and in 
a manner that is proportionate to the amounts in dispute and the complexity of the 
issues involved. 
The ethical obligation of diligence may be discerned in the references to promptness and 
proportion.  
As the NZIAC is administering the arbitral proceedings, it can ensure that the law of the seat 
is respected.207 The NZIAC Rules state that “The law applicable to the Arbitration shall be the 
Arbitration law of the seat of the Arbitration”.208 A NZIAC arbitration will generally be seated 
in New Zealand in which case the Arbitration Act will apply. This includes provisions relating 
to confidentiality.209 The control the NZIAC has over proceedings also puts it in a prime 
position to insist that the arbitrator complies with the parties’ arbitration agreement.  
The NZIAC is a relatively new institution and there is no commentary available on the quality 
of its regulation. However, it is in the interest of arbitral institutions like the NZIAC to protect 
their institutional credibility by ensuring high standards of arbitrator behaviour. On this basis 
one may assume that its regulation is adequate.   
The majority of this section has considered the NZIAC Rules. This is because the NZIAC is 
New Zealand’s only arbitral institution.  However, the fact that an arbitration in New Zealand 
is administered by an arbitral institution does not necessarily mean that the NZIAC Rules apply. 
It is open to the parties to agree on “modifications” of these Rules.210 Moreover, it is possible 
for an institutional arbitration to be seated in New Zealand yet administered by a different 
arbitral institution. Institutional proceedings through an offshore institution will not reflect the 
                                                             
205 New Zealand Dispute Resolution Centre, above n 199, at [5.13].  
206 New Zealand Dispute Resolution Centre, above n 199, at [2.1].  
207 New Zealand Dispute Resolution Centre, above n 199, at [1.4]. 
208 New Zealand Dispute Resolution Centre, above n 199, at [7.1]. 
209 See above discussion on confidentiality at 30.  
210 New Zealand Dispute Resolution Centre, above n 199, at [7.1].  
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New Zealand approach to arbitrators’ ethical obligations. Such situations are therefore beyond 
the scope of this paper.  
2 Enforcement by professional groups 
Professional groups also play an important role in regulating the behaviour of arbitrators. 
According to Willy: “Where the arbitrator is a member of a professional group such as AMINZ 
or LEADR, the investigatory or disciplinary bodies of those institutes are increasingly called 
upon to examine and decide such challenges [to the arbitrator’s integrity].”211 While not 
required by New Zealand law, professional group membership is nevertheless common 
amongst arbitrators and provides a platform through which arbitrators may advertise their 
services.212  
Some arbitrators appointed to international arbitrations seated in New Zealand will be members 
of professional groups that have no connection to New Zealand. In such cases ethical 
obligations may be enforced through the professional group the arbitrator belongs to. These 
situations will not involve the application of a New Zealand approach to ethical obligations 
and are therefore outside the scope of this paper.  
AMINZ is the primary professional group to which New Zealand arbitrators belong. Where 
New Zealand is chosen as the seat of an international arbitration, it is foreseeable that an 
AMINZ member will be chosen to arbitrate. AMINZ is in a position to enforce the ethical 
obligations of the arbitrator in such cases. Where this occurs the New Zealand approach to 
ethical obligations is relevant. The Code of Ethics that AMINZ members are required to abide 
by has already been discussed at length.213 
As arbitrators are often legally trained, it is possible that an arbitrator belongs to a law society.  
The New Zealand Law Society may arguably be used to enforce the ethical obligations of New 
Zealand lawyers that are acting as arbitrators in international arbitrations seated in New 
Zealand. While arguable, this paper submits that regulation through the New Zealand Law 
Society is inappropriate.  
The New Zealand Law Society is required to “enforce the provisions of [the Lawyers and 
Conveyancers Act 2006], and of any regulations and rules made under it, that relate to the 
                                                             
211 Willy, above n 94, at 87. 
212 For example, the AMINZ website allows people to ‘Find an Arbitrator’: see Arbitrators’ and Mediator’s 
Institute of New Zealand Inc “Search Panel/Lists” <www.aminz.org.nz>. 
213 See discussion on the ethical obligations of arbitrators at 20.  
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regulation of lawyers.”214 The Lawyers and Conveyancers Act requires that all lawyers 
providing “regulated services” must comply with the “duties of care owed by lawyers to their 
clients”.215 Regulated services includes “arbitration services” for the purpose of the Act.216  
Parties to an arbitration have significant control over who arbitrates their dispute and arbitrators 
are ultimately engaged to resolve the parties’ conflict. On this basis, it is fair to describe the 
parties to an arbitration as an arbitrator’s clients.  Accordingly, the arbitrator appears to owe 
the parties duties of care. The duties of lawyers may be found within the Rules of Conduct and 
Client Care.217 These Rules cover matters of competence,218 independence,219 and confidential 
information.220 
Assuming that ‘arbitration services’ includes the service provided by arbitrator it seems that 
the New Zealand Law Society can enforce obligations existing under the Rules of Conduct and 
Client Care when New Zealand lawyers act as arbitrators. However, it can also be convincingly 
argued that the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act and the related Rules of Conduct and Client 
Care were never intended to apply to arbitrators.  
The reference to ‘arbitration services’ is arguably only intended to refer lawyers representing 
parties within arbitration. Under this interpretation, lawyers acting as arbitrators do not need to 
observe the duties of care required of lawyers because arbitration is not a ‘regulated service’ 
for the purposes of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act. If this is accepted, the regulatory 
function of the New Zealand Law Society cannot extend to the regulation of arbitrators.  
The latter interpretation that excludes arbitrators from the Law Society’s regulation would be 
favoured by Rogers who argues that:221  
Bar authorities do not presume to apply their rules and disciplinary regime when an 
attorney they have licensed is serving, for example, as an umpire in a children’s Little 
League baseball game or youth football game. Those bar authorities seem similarly out 
of their league, so to speak, in extending their disciplinary authority to an attorney’s 
                                                             
214 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, s 65(c).  
215 Section 4.  
216 Paragraph (a) of the definition of “regulated services” in s 6 of the Act incudes “legal services”; Section 6 
defines “legal services” to mean “services that a person provides by carrying out legal work for any other 
person”; paragraph (d) of the definition of “Legal work” in s 6 includes arbitration services.  
217 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules.  
218 Chapter 3.  
219 Chapter 5. 
220 Chapter 8.  
221 Rogers, above n 15, at 87-88.  
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service as an arbitrator on the premise that serving as an arbitrator is simply another 
category of legal service. 
Rogers also notes that “a small but apparently growing number of national bar associations are 
seeking to impose ethical obligations on attorneys who are licensed by them and act as 
arbitrators.”222 This trend indicates that bar associations do not assume a regulatory function 
over arbitrators in absence of an express statement to this effect.   
While an argument can be made in support of the New Zealand Law Society regulating its 
members in their role as arbitrators, this argument can be convincingly rebutted.  Reference to 
‘arbitration services’ in the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act is better understood to refer to a 
lawyer representing a party in an arbitration. This limited interpretation is supported by 
examples of bar associations in other jurisdictions that have expressly extended their powers 
to regulate their members’ actions as arbitrators.223  
Finally, it is possible that an arbitrator does not belong to any professional group. Arbitrators 
are not required to belong to such organisations. Therefore, enforcement through professional 
groups will not be available in every case. 
3 Enforcement by the courts   
New Zealand courts also play a role in enforcing the ethical obligations of arbitrators involved 
in international arbitrations seated in New Zealand. In doing so, the courts will necessarily 
apply a New Zealand understanding of these obligations. While the capacity of the courts to 
enforce an arbitrator’s ethical obligations is fairly limited and the process may be slow, courts 
act as an important backup where arbitral proceedings are ad hoc and enforcement through 
professional group membership is unavailable.  
New Zealand has sought to minimise interference in international arbitration by limiting the 
scope of court supervision.224 New Zealand courts have “no general power to supervise the 
conduct of arbitrations other than that conferred by the legislation.”225 Accordingly, the 
Arbitration Act is the starting point for the following analysis of the courts’ role in enforcing 
                                                             
222 Rogers, above n 15, at 87.  
223  See Rogers, above n 15, at 87, where she refers to “Article 55 of the Italian Codice Deontologico Forense 
[which] specifically requires, among other things, that Italian lawyers who serve as arbitrators remain 
independent, disclose certain information about relevant contacts, and preserve the trust that parties place in 
them.” She also refers to developments in the United States of a “Model Rule for Lawyers Acting as Third Party 
Neutrals” and explains that while this Model Rule has not yet been adopted it has experienced support.  
224 Willy, above n 94, at 14.  
225 Willy, above n 94, at 82; see also Arbitration Act, sch 1, art 5.   
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the ethical obligations of arbitrators who preside over international arbitrations in New 
Zealand.  
This section begins by examining the limited supervisory role granted to the courts by 
legislation and how it can be used to enforce arbitrators’ obligations. The section then considers 
how courts may regulate an arbitrator’s ethical behaviour through award non-enforcement.  
(a) Supervisory role 
Schedule 1 of the Act allows parties to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator.226  A party’s 
challenge of an arbitrator will initially be sent to the arbitral tribunal to decide.227 If the party’s 
challenge is unsuccessful at this initial stage, that party may request “the High Court to decide 
on the challenge”.228  
It is also open to any party to request that the High Court considers the termination of an 
arbitrator’s mandate where that arbitrator is “unable to perform the functions of that office”.229  
This includes both factual and legal inability.230 The ethical obligations of an arbitrator may be 
relevant to factual or legal inability. 
The High Court’s ability to consider challenges to appointments and terminations of mandate 
is central to its supervisory role. The Arbitration Act’s confidentiality provisions are also 
relevant to the enforcement of confidentiality. The following discussion considers each of an 
arbitrator’s ethical obligations in turn to determine how they can be enforced by the courts.  
The limits of the courts’ supervisory role are then considered.  
(i)     Impartiality and independence 
A party may challenge an arbitrator where “circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to that arbitrator’s impartiality or independence”.231 Where the challenge proceeds to 
the High Court, the court has the power to consider the arbitrator’s partiality or bias.  Although 
the High Court’s ability to enforce impartiality and independence obligations in this way is 
                                                             
226 Article 13.  
227 Article 13(2); it is also possible for the arbitrator to withdraw at this point or for the other party to the 
arbitration to agree to the challenge in which case the arbitrator’s mandate will be extinguished.  
228 Schedule 1, art 13(3).  
229 Schedule 1, art 14(1); See also Willy, above n 94, at 82, where it is explained that art 14(1) provides the 
“only grounds for the removal of arbitrators”.  
230 Schedule 1, art 14(1).  
231 Arbitration Act, sch 1, art 12(2).  
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important, timeframes are set limiting when a party may challenge the appointment of an 
arbitrator.232 Therefore, a challenge will not always be available.   
In his book on arbitration in New Zealand, Willy suggests that “bias on the part of an arbitrator 
is grounds for removal” as it amounts to a legal inability to perform the functions of the 
arbitrator.233 If this so, the High Court can consider the termination of an arbitrators’ mandate 
due to a breach of the obligations of impartiality and independence. The court may enforce the 
fundamental obligations of impartiality and independence on this basis.  
(ii) Competence 
As noted above,234 a party may challenge an arbitrator’s appointment “if that arbitrator does 
not possess the qualifications agreed to by the parties.”235 If required to consider such a 
challenge, the High Court can enforce an arbitrator’s ethical obligation of competence to the 
extent that ‘competence’ relates to qualifications specified by the parties. However, challenges 
to the appointment of arbitrators not having specified qualifications have not presented 
difficulties in practice.236 It is therefore improbable that such a challenge would advance all the 
way to the High Court.   
Besides challenges predicated on an arbitrator’s lack of specified qualifications, the High Court 
can arguably enforce the ethical obligation of competence by terminating the mandate of an 
incompetent arbitrator. If an arbitrator is so incompetent that they are ‘factually unable’ to 
perform the functions of the office their mandate may be terminated under art 14(1). On this 
subject Willy says:237  
If the arbitrator does not possess the skill and experience professed at the time of 
appointment, then the arbitrator was liable to be removed under the [previous] Act and 
there seem to be no reason why that should not be the case under the 1996 Act. 
                                                             
232 Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, a challenge must be brought to an arbitral tribunal within 15 days 
of the party becoming aware of the “constitution of the arbitral tribunal” or the circumstances that give rise to 
“justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence”: see art 13(2).  After that, party has 30 
days to request the High Court to consider the challenge if the arbitral tribunal decides against the challenge: see 
art 13(3). Furthermore, under art 12(2), a party may only challenge an arbitrator they have appointed “for 
reasons of which that party becomes aware after the appointment has been made.”  
233 Willy, above n 94, at 83.  
234 At 26.   
235 Arbitration Act, sch 1, art 12(2).  
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However he does not believe that an arbitrator may be removed if the parties were aware of the 
arbitrator’s abilities and experience at the time of appointment. As Willy explains, “If the 
parties choose to put their affairs in the hands of an incompetent arbitrator then so be it.”238  
(ii) Diligence  
The High Court may be requested to “decide on the termination of mandate” of an arbitrator 
who “fails to act without undue delay”.239 When this occurs, the Court must determine what 
amounts to undue delay. This will inevitably involve consideration of whether the arbitrator is 
acting with appropriate efficiency in light of the issue they are required to decide. In 
considering the termination of mandate on the basis of undue delay the court is effectively 
enforcing an arbitrator’s ethical obligation of diligence.   
(iii) Confidentiality 
As discussed above, the Arbitration Act contains provisions governing the confidentiality of 
information.240 If the arbitral tribunal discloses information outside the exceptions provided for 
in s 14C, they will be in breach of s 14B of the Act. Where this occurs the concerned party may 
“seek an interim injunction measure from the High Court or the District Courts on application 
under art 9 of Schedule 1 or otherwise by way of injunction.”241 By granting an injunction the 
courts are enforcing the arbitrator’s ethical obligation of confidentiality.  
(iv) Compliance 
If an arbitrator does not comply with the terms of the arbitration agreement it may be possible 
for the High Court to terminate the mandate of the arbitrator on the grounds that they are legally 
unable to perform the functions of the office.242 The mandate to act as an arbitrator stems from 
the arbitration agreement itself. If an arbitrator does not comply with the arbitration agreement 
they are essential breaching their contract with the parties. Where this contract is breached, the 
arbitrator’s mandate ceases to exist. On this basis they are not legally able to perform the 
functions of the office.  
While this means of enforcement regulates breaches of an arbitrator’s contractual obligations, 
it must also be regarded as the enforcement of ethical obligations. This is because an arbitrator’s 
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contractual obligations that stem from the arbitration agreement are conflated with their ethical 
obligation to comply with the arbitration agreement. This means that it is possible for the High 
Court to enforce an arbitrator’s ethical obligation of compliance.   
(v) Limits of the courts’ supervisory role  
The ability of the High Court to enforce the ethical obligations of arbitrators who are acting in 
international arbitrations seated in New Zealand has been considered. While theoretically 
useful, there are nonetheless limits to enforcing ethical obligations through the New Zealand 
courts.   
Although Schedule 1 of the Arbitration Act applies whenever New Zealand is the seat of an 
international arbitration,243 this does not necessarily mean that proceedings are carried out in 
New Zealand.244 In some cases, New Zealand’s role as ‘arbitral seat’ will amount to a “fictional 
construct”.245 The disjoint between the seat of arbitration and the venue where arbitration 
actually takes place complicates enforcement through national court systems. It is harder for 
parties to request the High Court to consider challenges and terminations of mandate, or to seek 
injunctions from the courts, when they are not in fact in New Zealand.  
Where a request for the termination of an arbitrator’s mandate is made to the High Court, the 
Court must be satisfied that the arbitrator is legally or factually unable to perform their job. 
Legal or factual inability is a high standard. For an arbitrator to be considered unable to perform 
the functions of their office, their behaviour must be entirely unsatisfactory. If the arbitrator’s 
behaviour simply disappoints a party it is unlikely that the Court would consider their mandate 
terminated.  
The Law Commission’s 1991 report on arbitration indicates that the New Zealand courts should 
take a conservative approach to regulating ethical obligations.246 This is demonstrated in the 
Law Commission’s response to the suggestion that “the reference to ‘qualifications agreed to 
by the parties’ in article 12 could extend to those impliedly agreed, including competence and 
diligence”.247 In their opinion: 248 
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246 Law Commission, above n 93.  
247 Law Commission, above n 93, at [326]; see also Green, Hunt and Kennedy-Grant, above n 123, at 
[AHSch1.12.10]. 
248 Law Commission, above n 93, at [327]. 
 Arbitrator Ethics in New Zealand: the New Zealand Approach to Ethical Obligations in International Arbitration  
48 
 
…the general thrust of the [UNCITRAL] Model Law, and of the draft Act [now the 
Arbitration Act 1996], is inconsistent with an expansive interpretation of the scope of 
the challenges under Article 12, and that New Zealand courts would take a properly 
cautious approach to such arguments.  
Although dealing specifically with art 12, reference to the ‘general thrust’ of the Model Law 
and the Act indicates that the Law Commission expects the High Court to adopt a similarly 
cautious approach when considering the termination of an arbitrator’s mandate. 
(b)  Award non-enforcement  
Award non-enforcement, or the setting aside of an arbitral award, may be used by New Zealand 
courts to enforce arbitrators’ ethical obligations.249 Where an arbitrator has breached their 
ethical obligations, a party may apply to the High Court to set aside the arbitral award. 
Circumstances in which an application may be made to set aside an arbitral award are set out 
in art 34 of the Arbitration Act’s first schedule. Article 34 allows the High Court to set aside 
an arbitral award where the rules of natural justice have been breached.250 A party may argue 
that the breach of an arbitrator’s ethical obligation amounts to a breach of the rules of natural 
justice. 
While it is unclear what amounts to a breach of the rules of natural justice, there appears to be 
a high threshold required before an award can be set aside.251 While possible, enforcing ethical 
obligations through award non-enforcement is likely to be problematic. The Arbitration Act’s 
provisions for setting aside an award made in New Zealand are essentially the same as art 36 
which governs the recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award.252  
Article 36 is a reflection of the New York Convention, an international treaty that was created 
to facilitate the ‘recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards’.253 This Convention 
has a “strong pro-enforcement bias”.254 This pro-enforcement bias is likely to influence courts 
when considering an application to set aside an award under art 34.  Although awards made in 
                                                             
249 Rogers, above n 1, at 77. 
250 Articles 34(2)(b)(ii) and 34(6)(b).  
251 Green, Hunt and Kennedy-Grant, above n 123, at [ARSch1.34.09].  
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international arbitrations seated in New Zealand are not ‘foreign’ awards, the policy of 
enforcing arbitral awards made in international arbitrations is relevant nonetheless.  
The indirect influence of the New York Convention means that the High Court is unlikely to 
set aside an arbitral award made in an international arbitration seated in New Zealand, except 
in very serious cases of arbitrator misconduct. This leads to a disjoint between conduct 
standards – the standard of conduct that parties may expect from arbitrators – and the 
enforcement standards a court will apply when considering an application to set aside an 
award.255 This is not an adequate approach to enforcing the ethical obligations of arbitrators.   
C  An Outsider’s Perspective 
If New Zealand is to establish itself as a hub for international arbitration in the Asia-Pacific 
region, the approach taken to the enforcement of arbitrators’ ethical obligations must be 
acceptable to foreign parties. An ideal seat of arbitration would not allow unnecessary 
interference in arbitral proceedings.256 Parties often choose to arbitrate their dispute because 
they do not want to subject it to a national legal system.   
While international arbitration needs space to flourish, New Zealand should not simply sit back 
and become the ‘Wild West’ of international arbitration. Where an arbitrator behaves badly 
parties will expect a mechanism through which the ethical obligations of that arbitrator will be 
enforced.  
The arbitral institution that administers a proceeding, and any profession groups to which an 
arbitrator belongs, provide the best means of enforcing an arbitrator’s ethical obligations.  In 
New Zealand, the relevant organisations are the NZIAC and AMINZ respectively. Like 
arbitrators, “the individuals who staff regulatory authorities are products of a local legal 
culture.”257 The NZIAC and AMINZ will exercise an understanding of arbitrators’ ethical 
obligations that reflects the New Zealand context.  
Those calling on the NZIAC and AMINZ to enforce the ethical obligations of arbitrators should 
be satisfied with the enforcement of competence, diligence, confidentiality and compliance 
obligations. This is because the New Zealand approach to these obligations is relatively robust.  
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It is possible that foreign parties would find these New Zealand organisations to take a relaxed 
approach to the fundamental obligations of impartiality and independence.258 This is 
improbable where parties are from the small Pacific Island states for whom New Zealand seeks 
to be a regional hub.259  An issue is more likely to arise where parties are from countries in 
Asia which generally have far larger populations than New Zealand.  However, it is important 
not to overstate this possibility. While New Zealand’s context may result in a relatively 
‘relaxed’ approach to impartiality and independence, arbitral institutions and professional 
groups have an invested interest in ensuring high standards of arbitrator behaviour. In general, 
the regulation they provide should satisfy foreign parties.  
If enforcement through arbitral institutions and professional groups is unavailable, foreign 
parties may turn to the New Zealand courts to enforce an arbitrator’s ethical obligations.  For 
the reasons stated above, the capacity of the courts to assist parties is limited.260 The High Court 
may interfere in arbitral proceedings in instances of serious partiality and bias, serious 
incompetence, undue delay, or a breach of the arbitration agreement.  Parties may also seek an 
injunction from the courts where the Arbitration Act’s confidentiality provisions have been 
breached.  
The limited scope of New Zealand courts in regulating the behaviour of arbitrators involved in 
international arbitrations in New Zealand is appropriate. The capacity of the New Zealand 
courts to enforce ethical obligations in extreme situations reflects the courts’ role as an 
‘effective backstop”.261 The fact that New Zealand courts may enforce the ethical obligations 
of arbitrator in serious situations aligns with the legitimate expectation of protection that parties 
involved in international arbitration will have.  
The relaxed approach taken to impartiality and independence in New Zealand may also be less 
apparent in the enforcement of ethical obligations than expected. It is possible for those 
enforcing the ethical obligations of arbitrators to consider the expectations of foreign parties. 
The tribunal of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
contemplated cultural perceptions of impartiality in deciding Hrvatska Elektropriveda d. d. v 
                                                             
258 See discussion above on impartiality and independence at 21.   
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The Republic of Slovenia.262 Impartiality in that case arose when the “respondent retained an 
English barrister who was a member of the barrister’s chambers in which the [arbitral] 
Tribunal’s President was a door tenant.”263 While this relationship would be “perfectly 
acceptable” to English parties, it led the Croatian claimant to have justified doubts regarding 
impartiality.264 
While the approach of the ICSID tribunal has not officially been accepted in New Zealand, the 
decision attracted significant attention. It is likely that its approach would be adopted if a 
similar situation arose in the New Zealand context. New Zealand has demonstrated a desire 
follow international trends within arbitration.265 If a foreign party seeks to have an arbitrator’s 
obligations of impartiality and independence enforced in New Zealand, it is likely that the 
tribunal or court would accommodate their expectations as foreign parties.   
The approach taken to ethical obligations in New Zealand should generally satisfy foreign 
parties. Arbitral institutions and professional groups will usually be available to enforce the 
obligations of unsatisfactory arbitrators where New Zealand is the seat of an international 
arbitration. Where these enforcement options are unavailable, parties may rely on New Zealand 
courts to prevent serious breaches of ethical obligations.  
Although the approach taken to impartiality and independence in New Zealand may be 
regarded as relaxed, the tribunal or court deciding issues of impartiality and independence may 
take a foreign party’s expectations into consideration. On this basis, the approach taken to 
ethical obligations in New Zealand will be seen as satisfactory and New Zealand is likely to 
develop as a regional seat of international arbitration.  
D  Where to From Here?  
While New Zealand’s approach to enforcing the ethical obligations of arbitrators should satisfy 
the expectations of foreign parties, it is nevertheless appropriate to consider what can be done 
to promote New Zealand as regional hub of international arbitration.   
Self-regulation is the most effective means of enforcing the ethical obligations of arbitrators.266  
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The NZIAC and AMINZ must insist on high standards of arbitrator behaviour. This also applies 
to arbitral institutions and professional groups that are established in New Zealand in the 
future.   
 
While the New Zealand Government should not interfere with arbitral proceedings, it may 
support arbitral institutions and professional groups in promoting New Zealand as an arbitral 
seat in the Asia-Pacific region. Support may come in the form of funding or the sharing of 
resources with the NZIAC and AMINZ. The New Zealand Government may also use 
diplomatic relationships within the region to advertise New Zealand as a seat of international 
arbitration.  
 
In the same way that New Zealand arbitrators acting overseas would benefit from an ethical 
education, education can ensure that the New Zealand approach used in the enforcement of 
ethical obligations is well-regarded. Those charged with regulating arbitrators within New 
Zealand should understand that parties from different countries may have different expectations 
of an arbitrator and of those enforcing arbitrators’ obligations. Once aware of this, one may 
attempt to accommodate these differences.   
 
Finally, it is foreseeable that increasing numbers of New Zealand lawyers will find work as 
arbitrators if New Zealand establishes itself as a regional seat of international arbitration. If this 
is the case, it is important that these arbitrators understand the ethical obligations of arbitrators 
and how ethical expectations may differ between national contexts. An understanding of the 
ethical expectations of Asian and Pacific parties is particularly important given the intention to 
attract parties from within the region. The education of arbitrators will no longer be solely to 
assist New Zealand arbitrators working in international arbitrations overseas, rather it will play 
an important part in promoting New Zealand as a regional hub of international arbitration. 
 
VII  Conclusion  
It is essential to acknowledge one’s culture of ethics and to understand how this influences 
one’s understanding of arbitrators’ ethical obligations. The culture of ethics within New 
Zealand’s legal community is characterised primarily by the small size and intimate nature of 
its legal profession. This makes it relatively likely for individuals within the legal profession 
to know one another. Pragmatism and egalitarianism are also relevant to New Zealand’s culture 
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of ethics. The persistence of a pragmatic attitude prevents minor or trivial matters getting in 
the way of a job. While this attitude can be useful at times, it is not always conducive to careful 
consideration of ethical matters. Egalitarianism may influence the way the legal community 
reacts to instances of misconduct.  
The influence of New Zealand’s ethical culture on understandings of ethical obligations is most 
pronounced in relation to an arbitrator’s fundamental obligations of impartiality and 
independence. The small and intimate nature of New Zealand’s legal profession, combined 
with a pragmatic attitude, means that a New Zealand approach to impartiality and independence 
is likely to be perceived by outsiders as relaxed in instances where partiality and bias arise from 
an arbitrator’s relationships. On the other hand, a New Zealand approach to the obligations of 
competence, diligence, confidentiality and compliance is unlikely to attract negative attention 
within international arbitration.  
It is essential that New Zealanders acting as arbitrators in international arbitrations overseas 
are aware of the manner in which New Zealand’s ethical culture can influence understandings 
of ethical obligations. New Zealand arbitrators should exercise heightened awareness where 
obligations of impartiality and independence are concerned; they must be mindful of the fact 
that their understandings of these obligations may fall below the expectations of the parties to 
the proceeding. Education is important in raising the awareness of New Zealand arbitrators. 
The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration should be used by New 
Zealand arbitrators to lessen reliance on contextual understandings.  
A New Zealand approach to arbitrators’ ethical obligations will also be apparent where New 
Zealand organisations or courts are required to enforce the ethical obligations of an arbitrator 
in international arbitrations seated in New Zealand. Enforcement of the obligations of 
competence, diligence, confidentiality and compliance with the arbitration agreement present 
no perceivable problems. A New Zealand approach to these obligations is likely to meet the 
expectations of foreign parties. However, enforcement of an arbitrator’s obligations of 
impartiality and independence may fall below expectations.  
While a relatively relaxed approach to impartiality and independence may be expected to 
threaten New Zealand’s legitimacy as a regional hub of international arbitration, this will not 
necessarily be the case.  Arbitral institutions and professional groups are the primary regulators 
of arbitrator conduct. The NZIAC and AMINZ have an interest in maintaining high standards 
of arbitrator conduct and there is scope for them to adopt the approach of the ICSID tribunal 
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and accommodate the expectations of foreign parties. The regulation they provide is likely to 
satisfy foreign parties. The New Zealand courts may be regarded as a secondary regulator that 
will only interfere in very serious cases of arbitrator misconduct. While the ability of the New 
Zealand courts to enforce ethical obligations is limited, this situation is appropriate as it limits 
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